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Throughout most of the modern hi.story of'"the Western 
hemisphere, ·explorers, engineers and merchants have been 
~nt~rested·in finding or. building a waterway that would 
connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. By the early part 
of the sixteenth century most of these people had settled 
. . 
their attention on the Central American Isthmus. Several 
major commercia·l nations show'ed an interest in the project 
at one time or another, including France, Spain, Great 
.Britain and the United States . 
. Serious attentiop to building a canal started in the 
.late nineteenth. ~entury with two areas, southern Nicaragua 
and central Panama becoming the. two most logical sites for 
canal construction. By the ·middle of the 18.80·' s tne United 
States had private interests trying to start a canal in 
Nicaragua, while· the end of that decade saw the formation 
of a French canal in Panama. The United States seemed 
.committed to.a Nicaraguan canal.as late as 1901, yet the 
U.S. government eventually bought a concession, interceded 
in a rev9lution and built a canal through Panama. The pur-
pose of this paper is to investigate the major characters 
in th~ struggle to determine a canal route and to build a 
canal, and to ~nvesti'gate the role played by the ~everal 
presidential commissions established to discern both the 
feasibility of any canal and in the final analysis deter-
mine which canal route would be the best. Special emphasis 
was paid to the Isthmian Canal Commission of 1899-1901, 
pop:ula.rly known as the Walker Commission .. 
The primary data used· in this investigation were 
selected Senate and House Documents and Reports from ~he 
55th, 56th and 57th Congresses .in a special collection ·at 
the Port·land State University Library. Other impo-rtant 
documents used were the·' Hearings on the Rainey Reso·lution 
entitled "The S~ory of Panama," from· a House Report of 
. . 
the 63rd Congress founSJ. in the· Documents Library at the 
University of Oregon·, and Vo~ume XIV of the Private Papers_ 
of John Tyler.~organ, and Box 26 of his collected papers 
acquired by Portland State UniVersity from the National 
Archives. A .final important source of information was the 
Ne~ Y6rk Times for the years 1897-1902 available on micro-· 
film.at the Portland State University.Library. 
The research done for this paper 'has led me to be-
li·eve that several factors p·lay~d an important role in the 
Congressional decision to build a canal·through Panama, 
but the single most impprtant factor was the Report of 
the Isthmian Canal Commission of November 1901, and its 
supplemental findings of January 1902. 
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Chapter I · 
Ever since the day in 1513 when Vasco NtiTlez de Balboa 
si-ghted the great South Sea ·expl.orers, adventurers, and 
engine~rs hav~ dreamed of.buildi~g a passageway through the 
·central American isthmus. During the. litter part of the 
colonial period serious attention was turned toward the 
problem. Some form of commercial passageway was planned, 
either a c-anal or a roadway. Don Agustin Craine, a Spanish 
engineer, and the commander of the fort of San Juan de Ulloa 
in Vera Cruz, was pu~ in charge of an official ~urvey in 
1774. The survey recommended the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in 
Hexico as the most logical sit:e for a canal. The results 
of the survey were forwarded to the King of Spain, but more 
pre·ssing issues both in the colonies and at home demanded 
. 1 
his attention and no action was taken. 
The last decades of the eighteenth ·century saw revolu-
tions and international. upheavals both in the N~w World and 
on.the continent. Spain became embroiled first in the 
American revolution, as a reluGtant co-belligerent with the 
United States, and later in the French revolutionary wars 
caused b~ t~e French revolution and the Napoleonic Era. 
Despite the grave crisis thoughts of ~ canal were _not com-
plete ly forgo.tten. Alexander Humboldt, th~ noted German 
geographer and nattiralist, urged Ferdinand VII of Spain to 
1 Miguel·Cov~riubias, Mexico South: Th~ I~thmus of 
Tehaunte~ hereafter· cited Mexico South, p. 159. 
2 
build a canal at Tehuantpec in 1808. The urgings of Hum-
boldt and others finally convinced the King to take action. 
In 1814 the Spanish mbnarch ordered work to begin in .Mexico, 
but it was too late because the wars for independence had 
t t d . s . h Am. . 2 s ar e 1n pan1s er1ca. 
The s-ucce.ssful· ·revo'lutions .in Central America allowed 
both the United States and Great Britain to p\lrsue the com-
mercial interests .in markets they had wanted to exploit for 
many years .. Great Britain had actually settled on the 
Caribbean coast of Centrai America during the last part of 
the eighteenth century~ This settlement, Belize, had or-
iginally ·been established as a wood. cutting camp for ships' 
timbers and other marine uses. · Gre.at Britain and Spain had 
been embroiled in controversy over the ·area a~ early as the 
1790's. The British government claimed the land as open for 
he~ use, but made no· claim for colonialization. The con-
troversy was· unsettled at the time of the wars for indepen-
. 3 
dence. When the Central American isthm~s .became independent 
f~om Spain, Great Britain attempted to strengthen 'her 
position at Belize by making the area a formal crown colony. 
United States' interest in Central· America arose from 
several sources. New England merchants saw all of 
2 Ibid . , p . 16 4 • 
3 M. w. Wi'lliams, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy 
1815-1915 hereafter cited Isthmian Diplomacy p. 9. Also, see 
Troy. F.loyd, The Anglo-Spanish Struggle for Mosquito, the 
entire work deals with the question of seventeenth and 
eighteenth century friction in this area. 
3 
in~ependent New Spain as new markets open~ng up after the 
expulsion of the Spanish anp their closed mercantilist 
policies. Anglophobes of all stripes .. saw a. vacuum created 
·in Latin Americ~ with the withdrawal.of Spain, a·yacuum 
that Great Britain would fill.if the United States did not 
"do something. .Still ~thers in the United States believed 
'in the ideals of ~emocracy for all of the hemisphere and 
did not want to·~ee th~ return of European.domination, and 
its inevitable return to monarchical ways. 4 
· The. ·real confrontation between Great ·:Britain and the 
·united ·states in Cen.tral America came about in the second 
quarter of the rtinete~n~h century.· ~y the·beginning of the 
1830's the threat of ~rmed intervention from the countries 
of the Holy A~liance to help Spain regain her lost colonies 
was past. This realization c~eate~ an ~tmosphere of compe-
tition for domination between the United States ·and Great 
Britain. By '1840. both countries had discusqed serio.usly the 
possibility of building a canal a.cross the Darien Isthmus. 
Most preliminary. investigations had shown Nicaragua to be 
the m~st logical spot ~or the canal. The situation was 
complicated by British claims "in the area. ·Great Britain 
' . 
claimed a pro'tect:orate over the Mosquito Kingdom, the area 
inhabited by the Mosquito Indians normally considered a part 
of Nicaragua. ·Great Britain signed a·group of agreements 
with the Indians that .gave them virtual sove·reignty over 
·
4 Ibid. , Williams, p. 2 7. 
4 
the entire .area. .The agreements· further stated that the. 
Kingdom was fully independent of any other power, and laid 
out the boundaries of the country. The boundaries of the 
Kingdom included both sides of the San Juan.del Norte-River, 
which was considered the.best possible .site for the eastern 
t . f . . 1 5 erm~nus o any N~c;araguan Cana .. 
The government of Nicaragua after trying unsuccess-
fully t.o· settle .the ques.t~on directly with Great Britain·, 
turneq to the United States for he.lp. The U:Q.i ted States 
·was qui'te willing to.become involved, because.of th~. lively 
feeling of ~nglophobia, and the fear that a British canal 
might be. built to the commercial disadvantage of th.e Ameri~ 
can merchant. The situation between the two powers.became 
so strained that war rumors c~rculated through Washington 
in the late 1840 • s. 6 To avoid a head-on confrontat~on and 
possible. ·violence in 1850 negotiations opened in Washington 
between John Middleton Clayton, the United States Secretary ' 
of State, and Sir Henry Bulwer, the British Chargl d' Affairs. 
The riegoti'ations were a~duous, and often ·complicated by 
reckless actions involving both parties in Nicaragua. At 
one poi~t the negotiations were suspended when the British 
learned that ·t~e American Minister in Nicaragua had signed 
a secret agreeme~t with the ·Nicaraguan government that 
5 Ibid., p.' .47. 
6 Ibid . , p . 6 6 . 
5 
superseded-the treaty ·negotiations then in progress. Vio-
lence erupted when a contingent of the British navy seized 
an island that had always been under ~he jurisdiction of 
Nicaragua. 7 Fortunately for all, the cooler heads in· both 
Washington and London prevailed and the erratic actions of 
bo.th the American Ministe.r and .the British Adm~ral were 
·repudiated by their reppective governments. 'The Cabinet 
ordered the British navy to abandon "t7he island, ·.and Clayton 
recalled to Washington the American:Minister to Nicaragua. 
. ' 
The treaty was finally completed between Clayton and 
Bulwer. in 1850, putting an end. to direct conflict in 
Nicaragua for .over a· ?alf century. Great Britain quickly 
ratified th~ treaty, but strong opposition arose in 
Washington. t-iany members of Congress ·felt that Great 
Britain received all ~he benefits of the treaty while the 
U.s. gained little or nothing. Further _complications arose 
over the status of Belize. Several Senators argued the 
treaty was to settle the issues for all of Central America, 
but the British maintained that ·since Belize was .her pe~-
sonal property it lay outside the treaty. Great Britain 
particularly stressed this point after she had ratified the 
treaty, thus causing s~me Americans _to claim that the treaty 
was signed in.bad faith, and was invalid from the outset. 8 
7 M. W. Williams, "John Middleton Clayton" in Ameri-
CaD: Secret.ary of S.tates and their Diplomacy, S. F. Bemis 
editor, vol. vi~ pp. 65-82. 
8 Hufiter Miller ed., Treaties and Other Internation~l 
Despite some delays ·tl:le Senate ratified the treaty, with 
less than on~ day·'·s debate and no· amendments in 1851·. 
6 
The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty despite the controversy did 
s·ettle key· points of contention between all the parties. 
The Mosquito protectorate was· dissolved and Nicaragua's 
s~vereignt~ was firmly e~tablis~ed. Nicaragua agreed not. 
to punish the Mosquito Indians, nor treat them any dif-
ferently than any of their other citizens. More importantly 
the United States and Great Britain agre~d not to build a 
canal through Nicaragua unilaterally. 9 Thus both countries 
were treaty bound to .a joint project or. renegotiation. This 
portion of the t~eaty altered all proposed canal projects 
drastically. 
While the United States and Great Britain confronted 
each other in Nicaragua, other parties were busy trying to 
develop canal projects 'of their own. 
The Isthmus of Tehuantepec had not been forgqtten as 
' . 
a route possibility. Jo.st' de· Garay, a MexicaJ:?. promoter·, 
sought and received a concession from the government of 
I 
Antonio Lopez de 'Santa Anna. The concession, which h:elped 
finance further military adventures of the Generaliss.imo, 
. grante.d Garay ownership of any land that a canal would go 
Acts of the United States of Ame·rica, 685-87, Bulwer to 
Palmers ton. 
9 w. M. Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, Internati6nal 
Acts and Agreements Between the Un1ted States and Other · 
Powers, IV, 659-670. 
to through. 
The question of a·Tehuantepec canal came up later in 
the decade as a . result of the Mexican War. _During the 
truce of 1847 the American ·secretary of State, James 
Buchanan, pushed to have a treaty cl·ause that would guar-
antee fr~e transit across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec for 
. . ~· 
a·ll United States citizens.· The ·steadfast refusal of the 
Mexican_Government to agree to this, as well as certain 
7 
other demands of the United States caused the negotiations 
to break down, and hostilities started up again in Septem-
ber, 1847. The ensuing hostilities resulted in the U.S. 
occupation. of Mexico City, the defeat of the Mexican army 
and an unconditional surrender. In the :Peace negot._iations 
of 1848 Buchanan again.proposed free .transit for Americans 
on the Isthmus, and even hinted that. ·the United States 
might wish to buy the territory: both prop~sals were re-
jected. The final·· treaty between the United States and 
Mexico ga.ve tip a.ll claims to Te~as, California; and much 
of the' southwest ~n exchange· for fifteen million dollars_ 
-and unpaid claims_, but they_ refused. to give the United 
. 11 States ·any conces~i6~ or-privileges in Tehuantepec~ 
Despite the refusal of the Mexican Government to 
allow United States' interests on the Isthmus the two 
10 11 Report on Tehuanteoec Senate Document 23i, 56th 
Congress, lst Ses$iOn, p. 8j. ~ereafter cited "Tehuantepec.~ 
1
_
1 J. F. Rippy, The United States and Mexico, here-
after cited U.S. and Mexico, p. 23. 
governments were to clash within a few y~ars. Garay sold 
.his concession to Manning and Macintosh Co. of London in 
8 
'1848. _The transaction was kept sec-ret until 1849 when the 
company announced the purchase and tried to enforce the 
terms of. the concession. The Mexican Government balked at 
the purchas~ and claimed. that· the transfer of the concession 
was· illegal. Before the issue was settled an American. 
' ' 
banker, Peter A .. Hargous from New York, bought the conces--
• 
sion and tried to enforce the terms. The Mexic~n Govern-
ment reiterated that ~he. original transfer of 1848 was 
i~legal, and in 1852 went further declaring the original 
concession illegal. The Mexican Government s_tated :that the 
entire reign of Santa Anna had been in violation of the 
Mexican Constitution and any action _tak~n by that govern-
ment was void. Hargous .turned.to the United States Congress 
h ' 1 h. f . h. . 1 . 12 to e p: 1m en orce ~s·c a1m. 
A United States Senate committee investigated his 
claim an~ filed~ report~ The report fQund-th~t Ga~ay's 
original. claim· was. valid as was.its transfer to Manning and 
Macintosh C"o. ·The :r;eport therefore concluded that· the 
Hargous claim was valid. The report urged Congress to in-
form the Mexican government to r.ecognize the claim. · The 
·sectiona~ controversy in th~ United States made Congres-
sional action impossible on·the Hargous concession: The 
SQuthern.bloc ·refused to aid a New York.banker, and tha 
12 
"Tehuantepec," p. 89. 
g" 
issue was soon -laid aside. Hargous eventually sold his 
concession back·· to the_ Mexican Government for a fraction 
of its ~orth. 13 · The issues th~t were to result in the U.S. 
Civil War overshadowed all others ~n-~he 1850's t~us 
.Fushing catial interest into the background. 
The United St~tes hesides b.eing intereste·d in the 
Isthmus· of Tehuantepec and the Nicaragua canal also showed 
an .interest. in the Isthmus of Panama. .From the colo~ial 
period onward the Isthmus of Panama had been used as a road-
way for. goods from the Caribbean to the Pacific. Panama 
was a ,province of New .Granada (later calle~ Co-lombia) in 
the middle of the nineteenth century. The Isthmus was the 
most isolated p9rtion of the country, and was treated al-
most as a colony by the central 9overnment in Bogota. The 
. revenue garnered from the use·· of the Isthmian road made its 
way down to the capital leaving th,e province itself im-
poverished. The result was a constant attempt at revolu-
. . h . ' .14 t1on 1n t e prov1nce. Though the- revolutions wer~ 
uniformly unsuccessful they did lead to an un_stable busi-
ness atmosphere in the area. To stabilize the business 
climate there and at the same time insure the permanence 
of New Granada's claim~ .in Panama a' treaty was signed and 
ratified between New Granada and the United_States in 1846. 
13 Ibid., p. 89. 
r4 Miles DuVal, Cadiz to Cathay, p. 28; also D. C. 
Miner, The Fight For the Panama Route, hereafter cited 
Panama Route, p. 11. 
10 
The New Granada Treaty of 1846 provided for the use· 
of the United States Army .and Navy to insure order on the 
Isthmus. The central government was therefor.e insured 
that no revolutionary group w9uld be· successful •. In re-
turn·the United States citizens who traded on the Isthmus 
go:t equal treatment under the laws with citizens of New 
- 15 . . 
Granada. The United States ho.n.o.red their treaty obli-· 
g~tions several times. in. the next h~lf century to pres~rve 
oraer .on the Isthmus. President Theodore Roosevelt used 
the treaty as :justification for sending American Nava-l 
forces to Panama ·in ~ovember, 1903. 
The decades of the 1850's and the 1860's saw the 
United States preoccupied with mounting sectional· strife . 
and the ~ivil War, as a result. the interest in a trans-
isthmian canal waned. After the Civil War some earnest 
. . 
attempts were made to. revive interest in the project, but 
the first full ·.scale project came· not from America r or 
even from Great Britain,· but from France. 
Ferdinand de Lesseps, the great French· engineer who 
built the Suez· Cana~, had shown an intere.st in Panama for 
years. Finally with the prestige that· rested upon his 
name, arid an enormous subscription campaign waged through-
out France, enough money was raised to purchase a conces-
sion from .. the government of Colomb~a in 1881. De Lesseps' 
15 
"Corres.pondence Relating to Clayton-Bulw~r Treaty 
etc." Senate Document 161, 56th Congress, 1st Session, 
p. 196; also Miner, Panama RoUte, p. 11. 
11 
name op~ned up the doors but it was the subscription money 
from thousands of middle· class households. throughout France 
that provided the capita1. 16 
The De Lessep project· got off to a bad start and 
never recovered. The.company was_ mismanaged at ~very ievel. 
Th.e workers were paid low wages. whiie the supervisors lived 
lavishly. Money that was to be spent on equipment, and 
r·ailroads was funneled off to build fancy houses and prl.- ·· 
vate railway cars. Little real work was done, and equip-
;ment was lost, stol~n or allowed to rust ·in the. jungle. 
The-financial mismanagement of the company resulted in bank-
ruptcy and the en.suing s~ttlement ended up in the French 
17 
courts. The French courts found tpat the mismanagement 
in many cases amounted to fraud and embezzlement. Members 
. . 
of the board of directors as well as some officers, super-
visors, and engineers were imprisoned for their role in the 
company's scandal. Only De Lesseps' age and reputation 
saved nim from.prison, though neglig~nce rather.than avarice 
was h . . . 18 1.s maJor cr1.me. · 
The French courts liq'l:lidated "t:he old company and 
formed a new one, acquiring the initial capital from 
'' 
16 Mirier, Ibid.,. pp. 19-20. 
17 
"The Repor't of the Isthmian Canal Commission 1899-
1901" Senate Do.cument 54, 57"t;h Congress, 1st Se.ssion,. here-
after cited Walker Report, p .. 57. 
18 Philippe Bunau-Varilla, Panama: Creation, De-
struction, and .Resurrection, hereafter cited Panama, 
pp ~ 81-82. 
12. 
mandatory subscriptions from the main officers of the old 
company. These men were req~ired to put up funds from 
their own pockets. A percentage formula was worked out so 
th~t those who we~e most responsible for the collaps~ of 
the old company had to 'fund the mbst for the new. T_hough 
the former officers w~·r_e.requir~d t~ put up the_capital 
they were banned from having any positions of power, or 
from taking any part in ~he decision making proce~~ in the 
new company. Among the persons requi.red to .Put up money 
for the new company was a Fre·nch. newspaper publisher,. and 
his brother, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, an.engine~r on the 
project. The.Bunau-Varilla brothers were forced to put up 
nearly' two million francs. 19 
Philippe Bunau-Varilla was a graduate of the Ecole 
Technical France's most prestigous technical school. Like 
all of the gradua-tes Bunau-Varill_a was re·quired by French 
law ~o_serve his ?ountry for. a few years. This ~uited 
Buna'f:l-Vari_lla's plans, and he desperately sought an appoint-
ment as an engineer on the Pan'ama.· p~oject. The young 
engineer was driven by a number of forces: patriotism,. q. 
belief in De Les.s~ps, the grandeur of the projec~, and. a 
lust for powe~ and wealth. Thdugh trained as an engineer 
Bunau-Varilla's.real talents were those of promoter and 
propagandizer. Despite the failure of the first French 
company, a Panama canal Qecame his obsession for the· rest 
19 Gerstle Mack, The Land Divided, p. 418. 
13 
of. his life. 20 
Five years before De Lesseps obtained his·concession 
a group of Americans founded the Nicaragua Canal Co. In 
1877 Ulysses S. Grant, the -still popular former president, 
ascended to the presidency of the company. His. role wa.s 
tha~ of a figurehead, but his p~esence added greatly to 
th~ pres~ige of the organization. The company purchased 
a concession and started preliminary enginee!ing surveys. 
The surveys showed the feasibility of several Nicaraguan 
·21 routes~ Despite ·the prestig~ous chief executive, the 
Nicara_gua ~anal Company never receiv~d proper financial 
backing, and at the end of the d~cade it gave way to the 
.better financed Maritime Canal Company. At the same time 
President Rutherford B. Hayes became a vocal proponent of 
a N.:j_car.agua canal. Hayes _and -a number of businessmen rea-
lized the commercial benefits that would be granted to the 
country that built and maintained a canal. With the 
; · beginni~g o.f the French proj eqt in the ear.ly eighties 
American resolve to build a Nicaraguan canal was reaffirmed. 
The United States must build the first canal,_ and with the 
. 22 French in Panama., Nicaragua became the "American"· canal. 
20 Bunau-Varilla wrote three s.eparate memoirs, all 
concerned with his two great obsessions, the Panama proje9t, 
and his hatred of Germany. 
21 
. "Tehuant~pec" p. 128 (see 13). · 





The United Sta.tes Congress was com.mitted to a policy 
of a canal built by private enterprise, but at. the same 
time they realize.d the need for more awareness of the po-
litical and engineering situation. To insure. that the 
Congress ~ould be more aware, the Senate established a sub-· 
committee on the Nicaragua Cana.l out of the Commerce Com-
mittee .. This smalt subcommittee over the years would ex-
pand in size and importance until it became the· Senate 
Committee on an Isthmian Canal. One of the ·original mem-
bers of the subcommittee was Senator John Tyler Morgan of 
Alabama. 
John Tyler Morgan was a small town lawyer who had 
been involved in Alabama politics since before the Civil 
War. Morgan had taken part in ~he Alabama secession con-
vention, where he was generall¥ recoqnized as the most 
eloquent speaker. Whe'n ·Alabama left· the Union in late 1860 
Morgan gave up his l:aw .Practice to enlist in the new Con-
federate Army. By the time of Lee's surrender Morgan held 
the rank o.f Brigadier General in the· cavalry, and had 
taken part in several df th~ key engagements of the war. 
Besides bein<.r cited for bravery, Morgan also showed leader-
ship and administrative talents. At the end 'of the war 
Morgan. returned to the practice of law, but he hoped to 
some day become involved in polit~c~. In 1877 reconstruc-
tion officially came to an end with the withdrawal .of the 
last of ~he Federal troops, and .the acceptance· of all the 
I 
former Confederate· state·s back into the national government. 
15 
Morgan, though on~y 41 and completely unknown outside of 
his home state, was elected by· the Alabama legislature to 
the. United States Senate,. a position he was to hold for the 
rest of his life·. Morgan's interest in a canal dominated 
his career. and earned him the informal title of "father 
of the transisthmian canal." 23 
While the French were busy mismanaging the Panama 
;· project. Senat·or Morgan· and hip allies. wer~ working . in the· 
I 
'. ! 
Senate. Morg.an • s· interest in the Nicaragua project stemmed 
.from several sources. Morgan.realized earlier than ·many 
of his Southern colleagues that the Federal government 
could not be overthrown by military ~ight, and that if the 
South were to reg~in any of its fallen st~ture an alterna-
tive form of·power was needed. Morgan believed that a 
·Nicaragua canal would be of added advantage to the South. 
Several'factors were responsible for the South's in-
ability.to progress economically. with the rest· of the 
country. The Civil War had been fought mainly. on Southern 
land, resulting in the des.truction of some means of pro-
duction~ A second major problem for the region was its 
lack of shipping routes. All ~he major transcontinental 
railroads went across.the upper Midwest and the Great 
Plains; Southern. cities were connecte~ only by feeder· lines. 
Morgan saw the building·of a canal as a way of equalizing 
23 . 
August Radke, "Senator Morgan and the Nicaraguan 
Canal" Alabama -History Review, January .1959, hereafter 
cited :• Morgan, .... p. 11. 
16 
the shipping patterns. The Nicaragua Canal would be ·a 
p~rticular boon to.the Southern ports. Goods shipped to 
Hawaii, San Franqisco, or the Orient would have from nine 
·.days to ·three weeks head start if shipped. from Southern 
ports via the Nicaragua route, .as opposed to East~rn p9rts. 
A similar canal built through Panama would remove ~ost of 
the Southern .advantage, due to the prevailing shipping 
lanes. 24 If a Nicaragua canal was built Mobile, New 
Orleans, and Houston would soon equal Eastern ports in 
importance in the ·international trade. Throughout the 
eighties and nineties Morgan and his allies introduced 
canal~ills in the Senat~. 25 
The leading advocate of a Nicaraguan Canal in the 
House of.Representatives was William Hepburn, a Republican 
from Iowa, and the head o.f the House Interstate Comme.rce 
Committee. Hepburn's motives for wanting a canal are not 
as clear as Morgan's. Iowa would not be directly affected 
by either the Nicar~gua, or Panama route, in fact the rail-
.road intere~.ts were very powerful in his home state·. TWo 
reasons ·for ~is advocacy can be found in his pronounce-
ments: the Panama route was "French," thus Nicaragua be-
came the 11 Arnerican" route; and,.his antbition for fame 
required his authorship of the final bill.~ 6 
24 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
25 Ibid., 12. Also Miner, Panama Route, 26. p. p. 
26 Radke, Ibid. , 9-22. pp. 
I. 
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These early attempts to pass a Nicaragua ·Canal Bill 
snagged on two issues. The first concerned credit for the 
authorship; in the 1880's and the early 1B90's both Hepburn 
and Morgan wanted the honor. ·The other issue concerned the 
Maritime Canal ·Company. Morgan. felt that the· Maritime · 
Canal Com~a~y d~served compensat~on for both its ea~ly sur-
veys and the right of way and.related concessions. By the 
middle of the eighties the company realized ·that a govern-
ment subsidy W<?uld. not be enoug.h to finish the canal. With 
this in mind, the company ··attempted to _cultivate 'friendly 
Senator$ and Con.g:r;essmen to have the government either be-
come a partner in the enterprise. 1 or to puy them OU't c'om-
. 27 
pletely. Repre~entative Hepburn and others saw this first 
option as most likely illegal, and reasoned that if a joint 
partnership was illegal then buying the coh.cess~on was .un-
necessary. 'The Maritime Canal Company had done nothing of 
substantial value,' and direct negotiation with the government 
of Nicaragua wou~d be necessary before the ·unit~d States 
. could. receive a concess1on. The·refore ·it sen:ted both expen-
sive and frivolo'us· to deal. at all wi~h the comi?any. 28 
In the early years n:either Morgan n<?_r Hepburn would 
compromise on either authorship or the role of the Maritime 
Canal Company. As a ·result every time Morg~n introduced a 
CC:lnal bill into the Republican-dominated Senate it was killed 
2'7 
"Tehuantepec" p .. 144 (see 13). 






without a full hearing. 29 The situat.ion might have gone on 
indefinitely had it not.been for the c~a~ging situation in 
Panama. 
The New French Panama Canai Compa~y was formed by 
the French courts and was ready to go to work by ~S94 • 
Though work began a~ai~ in earnest, it was obvious from the 
outset that mor·e troub.le lay ahead. The taint of ·scandal · 
remained on the project despite the fact that no one associ-
ated with the old company had any authority in the n·ew ven-
· ture. Whereas the old company had had no trouble raising 
funds from the French public, the new company was doomed to 
insolvency from the outset. Too· many people had los·t too . 
much money to invest in a canal·again. After 1895 the 
company realized that selling out might be 'the best solu-
tion~ One of the first steps taken by the c~mpany in ·t~_is 
direction was the retention, in 1896, of Wil~iam Nelson 
. . 
9romwell as chief legal counsel for the cpmpany. · 
William Nelson Cromwell was the senior partner in 
the law firm of Cromwell and Sullivan, a New York-based firm 
with a reputa~ion for salvagin~ founde~ing businesses; 30 
Cromwell, a man with a. quick legal mind and a. flair for the 
dramatic, \¥as ·distinguished looking with prematurely gray · 
hair worn unfashionably long· for a more august appearance •. 
He used both his'mind and his social graces to convince and 
29 Ibid. I p . 19 • 
30 Miner, Panama Route, p. 76. 
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caj.ole in the interest of his clients. Cromwell was not a 
newcomer to the transisthmian question-s; he had been the 
chief legal .counsel ·for the Panama Railroap Company for some 
31 
. year~. 
The .year 1896 being an election year proved to be a 
turning point on the canal issue.. Th:e· election of the Re-
publican William McKinley ·stimulated renewed hope in the 
hearts of American imperialists. McKinley's ,predecessor, 
Grover Clevel:an.d, while not open.ly hostile to a canal had 
moved wit~ caution on tbe quest~on and had gone so far as 
to drop a treaty in the works at the time of his first in-
auguration. The Zavala-Frelinghuysen Treaty would have 
cleared the way for the construction of a canal through 
Nicaragua, built exclusively by .the United States.· Cleve-
larid's major objection to the treaty was its unilateral 
abrogation 6f the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 which for-
bade any ~icaraguan canal to·be ~uilt un1laterally by either 
the, u.s. or Great Britain. Cleveland maintained that the 
United States had no right to abrogate a treaty signed in 
good faith if the other party to the treaty had done nothing 
to.violate it. 32 While McKinley did not publicly favor 
abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty he.was on record 
in favor of a canal. 
. 
31 Charles- Ameringer, "The Panama Canal Lobby of 
Phi.lippe Bunau-Varilla, and Wm. Nelson Cromwell" American· 
Historical Review, January 1963, LXVII.I, No. 2, p·. 3'47. 
32 
·william.s, Isthmian Diplomacy,. p. 2 86. 
20 
The Republican platfOrl.l\ of 1896 called for the· ·Sur-
veying and building of a canal through Nicaragua by.the 
government of the United States. 33 A. survey to. study po-
tential.Nicaragua routes had been carried out by Philip 
Ludlow· an American engineer iri 1895. The res'ults of the 
survey clearly showed the fea~ibility 0f a Nicaragua canal 
and even contained estimated costs. 34· Though the Ludlow 
survey was the mos·t complete one· of its kind to date by an 
American, the McKinley Administ.ra tion recommended that a 
new commis.sion be established to redo· the work. In 1~97 
President McKinley established a commission to carry out the 
~ew survey. The commissiqn consisted of three members, · 
Colonel John· Hains of the Army. Corps of Engineers, ·Professor.· 
Arthur Haupt·, a noted Ciyil Engineering .p·rofessor, and Rear 
Admiral John· G •. walker .of t~~ United States NaVy as the 
P.resident. The commission provided for a completely new 
survey of all feasible routes through Nicaragua, to be done 
by a staff of engineers and scientists appointed by Admiral 
Walker. The work st.arted in 1897, and was to take the 
. . 35 better part of two years to complete. 
While th~ngs were thus progressing in the -Executive 
33'. k Rad e, 11 Morgan 11 p. 15. 
. . 34 . 
"Correspondence Relating to the Interoceanic 
Canal," Senate Document [.11], 56th Congres.s, 1st Session, 
.P· 71. 
35 
"Report of the Nicaraguan Canal Commission 1897-
1899, 11 Senate Document. 114, 56th Congress,.· 1st Session, 
herea.fter cited 11 First Walker Repor~" p. 1. 
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branch the Legislative branch was not idle. In 1896, one 
year prior: to the orqanization of the first Walker Commis-. 
sian, Senator Morgan finally saw his N~caragua canal bill 
pass on the floor of the· Senate. The bill,: however, did 
. . 
contairi·certain proyisions th~t made final acceptance·for 
both Houses doubtful.·. No clear de.ci:sion on what to do with. 
the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was included. A second drawback 
lay in the fact that Morgan's. Biil called for finan'cial 
compensat.ion for the Maritime c·anal Company, and· finally 
the bill was.under the sponsorship of Morgan, and not the 
bill-that the Republican Hepburn desired. These combina-
tions of negative factors.plus·united States preoccupations 
with other problems led to the ultimate she·lving of the 
b. l.'ll . h f R . · · 36 1.n t e.House o epresentat1.ves. The passage of thig 
bill through the Senate was as close to victory as Morgan 
was ever to get. 
The beginning o£ the year 1897 saw Cromwell.begin 
direct action in trying to divert the Nicaragua Canal Bill. 
Though his tactics were va.ried his immediate goai was to 
stall. The pas.s.age of a Nicaragua Bill seemed inevitable 
in 1897, so Cromwe'll rea.;I.ized that· these first manuevers 
were critical. ·The ultimate aim was to educate or indoc-
trinate en.ough of the Senate to the advantages of a Panama 
route, bu~ this education took time. Cromwell felt that 
his. best argument hinged on the Walker Commission ·report. 






No action. should be taken to propose a canal through Nic:;::ara·-
gu·a until all the evidence from the commission had been 
\'!eighed. 37 .Thus a commi~sion· formed to _promote a N.icar~gua 
Canal was being used by Panama interests· as a stalling 
tactic. 
While. the Walker Commission worked in Nicaragua_ the 
eyes of most of the country turned to another part of .Latin 
America-...;..Cuba. The two· areas were· to become interrelated 
ih 1898. Cuba had waged a war against Spain for indepen-
dence since the beginning of.the decade, though they did 
not seem near military victory, they had aroused world con~ 
cern. Un~ted States interest and involvement in .the revo-
lution led to deteriora.tion of realtions· between the· United 
States and ~pain which led to a formal declaration of war 
in 1898· •. 
One of the results of the Spanish American War was 
a renew~d ery for a transisthmian canal. Even ·before the 
war I advoc·ates of a great American Navy argued the n~cessi ty 
of a canal. ·Captain Alfred T. Mahan, the chief propagandist 
for·a great Na.vy, argued that the building of a canal would 
virtually doub~e the size. of the fleet. 38 ·The fleet could 
get from the.Atlantic to the Pacific rapidly with a new 
canal.. Captain Mahan influenced many prominent men, in-
eluding McKinley's Undersecretary of the Navy, an ·avid 
37 Miner, Panama Rou~e, p. 80. 




naval history buff, Theodore Roosevelt. 
. ' 
When the war broke out much of America's coastal 
fleet was in the Pacific.· The battleship Oregon was berthed 
in Puget Sound, but immediately ordered to Cuba. The 
cruise of the battleship Oregon through the Straits of 
·Magellan captured the ~magination of the press and the Am-
erican public. Newspapers ran almost daily progress reports 
on the ship. 39 When the battlesh~p finally reached.Santi-
ago after a sixty~nine day cruise the country was both 
amazed and horrified. Sixty-nin·e days was a record for such 
a journey, but it was also a long time in a short war. Ad-
vocates of a c.anal pointed out that the journey could have 
been cut by as much as two thirds· if a canal had existed 
in Nicaragua. 40 The need for a canal got a furt~er b~ost 
from the Spanish-American War.. The overwh~lming victory of 
~he United States ·brought about. the formation. of an instant 
overseas empire. Puerto Rico, .cuba, and the Philippines 
all ·carne under American jurisdiction as" a result of the· 
treaty. A can~l would b~ing these possessions closer to-
gether·, and closer. to United States ports. Some imperial-
. . . d '1 . 41 d 1sts env1s1one Man1 a as an Arner1can Hong Kong~ an saw 
that a canal would cut thousands of miles. from Manlla to 
~ 9 Portland· Ore,goriiari throughout the two month 
period . 
. 40 Radke , "Morgan , " p . 1 7 • 
41 Ibid. , p. 19. 
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either the Gulf Coast or Atlantic ports~ The stage was now 
set for a canal. The war had made most· of the United States 
realize the need for a canal. The only questions left were 
what kind of a canal, and which route would be the best. 
As the winter session of 1899 t·urned toward spring, 
and adjournment the final report. of ~he Walker Commission 
was sent to Congress. The report covered two routes as most 
. . 42 likely; both through N1caragua. The differences·in the 
two routes were minor, .and both covered approximately the 
same ground. The report leaned toward one route because it 
would be cheaper. ·All findings of previous surveys were . up-
held on the question of feasibility. The· report estimated 
the cost at $120 ~illion. This ~stimate included a sizeable 
percentage for unfbreseen problems, a~cidents and other con-
tingen·cies. . Admiral ·.walker, Colonel Hains, and Professor 
Haupt all gave their unconditional approval to the project, 
though Professor Haupt added his own cost estimate o~ just 
over $134 million. 43 
The Nicaragua canal Senator .Morgan had worked for 
since the early 1880's seemed assured in the spring of 1899. 
The Walker Commission on·a Nicaragua Canal_had g.iven a 
favorable report, and Senator Morgan and Repre-sentative 
Hepburn had ironed out their differences. Morgan realized 
·after the defeat of his bill in the House in 1896 that he 
42 . 
"First Walker Report," p. 3. 
43 Ibid. 
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would have to give in on certain issues if the bill were 
to ,pass through both chambers. Morgan therefore agreed to 
abandon the Maritime . Canal Company' s· claims and to allow 
Hepburn to sponsor the bill. 44 ·The· two men could now work 
in complete harmony on the .}?ill. Hepburn and Morgan,'s ~p- · 
timism was to be short-lived, as the Panama Route had picked 
up some.powerful allies; including· Senator Ma:t;"CUS Alonze · 
Hanna .of Ohio. 
Mark Hanna, the junior Senator from Ohio, was one of 
the most powerful men in the country in 1899 •. A coal and 
. . 
~hi~ping magnate from Cleveland, Hanna was President 
McKinley's ·best friend in government, and more.than. any 
-other man, had been instrumental in making .McKinley the 
President. The Senator was· also the· Chairman of the Repub-
lican National Committee and the chief fund raiser for the 
party. Hanna's first interests in the·canal issue came as 
.a result of a conversa~ion he had with Philippe·Bunau-
Varilla at· a luncheon in Cincinnati. Bunau-Varilla claims 
h . d f h . . d. 1 .. 45 e conv1nce Hanna o t_ e Panama route 1mme J.ate y .. This 
claim like many of Bunau-Varilla's·is undoubtedly an exag-
geration. Hanna was too shrewd a businessman and pmlitician 
to be convinced by pure rhetoric. Soon after·hearing the 
. . 
French engineer, Hanna> heard that the Panama. project might 
be·for iale. This aroused Hanna's business interest. The 
44 Radke, "Morgan," p. 21. 






Panama route, already started,m.;igr{t be a sounder investment 
than the Nicaragua proj e·ct, and Hanna fel.t the possibility 
should be invest~gated. Rumors started at the time, that· 
, . . 
have continued to.the present day, tie Hanna's decision to 
a ·campaign contribution of $60,000 for the Republi.can party . 
from William Nelson Cromwe11. 46 This explanation, like 
Bunau-Varilla's, is also an oversimplification. Hanna at 
no time acknowledged receipt of the money, and Cromwell him-
self made no mention of the donat-ion. Furthermore, despite 
the magnitude of the sum, Hanna received even larger sums 
for the party·the same year with no strings attached. 47 A 
combination· of· factors in.fluenced Hanna, but his business-
man.' s outlook made an investigation of the Panama Route. 
necessary in h:j.s eye~·· 
Through the influence of Senator Hanna, and other in-
fluential. Republicans Congress authorized, at the Presi-
dent's reque'st, a new commission. This commission, auth-
orized March 3, 1899, was 
. • • empowered to make full and complete investi-
gation ·.of the Isthmus of' Panama with a view to the 
construction of a canal by the United States across 
the same to connect the .Atlantic and-Pacific oceans; 
that the President is authorized to make investigation 
46 House Hearings; on the Rainey Resolution, 63rd 
Congress, 1st Session, pp. 15 7-15 8,- "The Story of Panama" 
contains the so-called Cromwell Brief, hereafter cited as 
"The Story of .Pan.ama." The news of the contribution was 
reported in'direc'tly by a report from ·John Hall of the New 
York Sun, and was never verified anywhere by either Hanna 
or·cromwell. 




of any and all practicable routes for ~ canal 
across said Isthmus of Panama, and particularly 
to ·investigate. the two rutes.known respectively 
as the Nicaraguan· route and the Panama route, 
with a view of. determining the most practicabl·e 
and feasible route for such canal, together with 
the proximate and probable cbst of constructing 48 
a canal at each ot: two or more said ·r.outes . . . 
The President was further authorized to spend up to one 
million dollars on the commission. 
27 
The makeup of the new commission concerned Cromwell 
and· he disp<?-t.ched a list of recornrnendations to the President. 
The. attorney also took action at this 'time to try to halt 
any aciion on the part of the Nicaraguan proponents, by. 
bringing· up the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty as a barrie~r t·o uni-
. lateral action in Nicaragua .. 49 In later. years Cromw~ll was 
·. to claim 'inordinate credit for the makeup of 'the Isthmian 
Canal Commission. The. claim lacks a certain .validity when 
one realizes that· the backbone of the commission was the 
same as the ·.previous one, and that the only man Cromwell 
did not want on the board, Professor Haupt, was reappointed. 
President· ~cKinley. annou~ced his appointments to the 
new commission in· June 1899. Rear A~miral Walker was aga~n 
appointed.President, and Colonel Hains as well as Professor 
Haupt was asked ~o s~rve again. Six new people were ap-
pqinted.to the boa~d along with the three holdovers. In-
eluded in the.six were Professor Emory John~on, a 
4 8 
· "Walker R t 11 3 epor , p. . 
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transportation expert from Cornell .University and strong 
advocate of·a canal,·and a Mr. Pascoe, a former Democratic 
Sena'tor from Florida. The commission was divided into five 
sub-committees. to investigate th~ different .aspects: the 
Nicaragua.route, the Panama route, any other rou~es, indus-
trial, commercial and mi.litary v~lue of a canal, and inves-
. 50 
tigations of rights, Privileges and franchises. 
The makeup of the s·econo Walker Commission .drew a 
.positive reaction for the most part. The New York Times in 
an editorial com.ritended the President .for t~e non-partisan 
nature of the commissi_on al).d. the high caliber and integrity 
. 51 
of its membership. Despite the praise, harmony did not 
reign among the.members~ip of the new group. Professor 
Haupt. was quoted in a leading Philade:J_.phia newspaper as 
s~eing a conspiracy against the.Nicaragua route in the very 
for~ation of the new group. Haupt hinted that the pro- · 
.Panama forces were responsible, and that railroad interests 
h 1 d 1 . th t 11 . . . 52 may a.ve p aye a ro e ~n e rna ter. as a s.ta ·~ng tact~c. 
The'stat~ments allegedly made by the Professor raised a 
clamor from both sides. A se.cret role played by the rc;il-
roads was suspected by many.· The New York Times suggested 
more than once during this period that those who clamored 
for a Panama route might be. railroad men hoping to defe:a·t 
50 
"Walker Report, " p. 3. 
51 New York T' J 13 1899 6 ~~~~~~·~~~m~e~s~, une , , P~ . 




any proposed canal.· The Pan~ma proponents demanded 
Haupt's resignation for hi.s alleged s"t;ate~ents. The·pro-
fessor in his own. defense· denied that he had stated a con-
spiracy existed, though he admitted that he was convinced 
that the Nicaraguan route was best, and that the chances 
f h . h . h. . . 1' . bl ' 54 o 1m c ang1ng 1s op1n1on were· neg 1g1 e. W.ith the 
controversy unsettled the Isthmian Canal Commission set 
out for Paris in August, 1899, to investigate· the records 
of the New French Panama Canal Company. 
53 New York Times, July 9, 1899, p. 6. 
5
.4 Ibid., July 27, 1899, p. 4. 
CHAPTER II 
The Isthmian Canal Commission went to Paris., and the 
proponents of the Nicaragua route turned·to a new problem, 
the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. The treaty of lBSO specifically 
prohibited the ·building of a canal across Nicaragua ·uni-: 
laterally by e~ther the United State~ or Great Britain. 1 
The terms· of t~e treaty wer~ clear and the meaning was ob-
. . 
vious, still even before renegotiations could start certain 
members.of the Senate called for abrogation. The jingoistic 
Sena.tors were in the foreground denouncing the treaty. Their 
arguments were both varied and, V.ehement. The treaty could 
be abrogated. because it ·had been ratified under false. pre-
tenses in 1850 as it applied to .British Honduras. The 
treaty by limiting United States action.in Latin America 
·· vis-a-vis a European power, violated the· tenets of the Mon-
roe Doctrine was a second argument for abrogatiqn. The : 
treaty was obsolete ·and applied to an· earlier era, but 
United States' progress· could not and should · n.ot be limited 
2 bi a fifty year.old white elephant. Tho~gh ~hese Senators 
C?lling for abrogation for these and. other reasons wer·e 
vocal, "t:hey w~re in a distinct minority. The overwhelming 
number of Senators favored renegotiation as the method that 
1 
"Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, .. in Treaties, Conventions, 
International Acts and· Agreements Between the United States 
and Other Powers, IV. 
2 
"Hearings ·Of. Foreign Relations Commit.tee ,·" Senc;:tte. 
Document 268, 56th Congress, 1st Session, p. ·310. 
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seeme·d most reasonable. 
John Hay, the American Secreta~y of State,. proposed 
that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty· should be modifie.d throug_h 
negotiation with ·Gre~t B~itain. Hay was a man of integrity· 
who felt that the United States would sacrifice its great-. 
ness in the eyes of the rest of the world if any attempt 
was made to abrogate a treaty signed in good .faith, without 
cause. 'To this end Hay made initial advances to Lbrd 
Pauncefote, the British Ambas~ador to the pnited States. 
Lord Pauncefote was one of Gteat Britain's most respe~ted 
diplomats, and like Hay, a man of unimpeachable integrity. 
·Pauncefote also carried a lot of weight with the government 
in London. Hay .felt that Pauncefote's reputation would 
. . 
help the two men to negotiate a tre.aty that would be ac-
ceptable in both capitals. 3 . 
The ·governme·n·t o.f Great Britain ag;reed willingly- to 
discuss renegotiation_and the rewriting of the new .treaty 
c.ame about early in 1900. Though not known at th~ time the 
first Hay-Pauncefot.e Treaty was drafted. almost ·exclusively 
by Lord ·Pauncefote and his staff. The treaty was then sent 
to the American Secretary of State for mi:h_or modification. 4 
Hay and Pauncefote agreed fro~ the outset that it should 
appear th~t-Hay had.written the majority of the.treaty to 
3 J. A. s. Grenville, "Great Britain and the Isthmian 
Canal 1898-1901," An).erican Historical Review LXI, No. 1, 
October 1955, hereafter cited "Britain and the Canal . .-" 
4 Ibid. , p. 57. 
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better insure ratification by the Senate·. Lord Pauncefote' s 
role was kept secret because of the still widespr~ad· ~e~ling 
of Anglophobia in certain segments of American·society. The 
Anglophobes distrus·ted ·Hay from the outset because of his 
reput~tion a,s the number one-Anglc;>phile in the administra...; 
tion.· 
The treaty. of February 1900, which had to await the 
December sessio·n of Congr_e-ss, contained many concessions to 
.the Americans that favbred a government-owned canal. The 
United States was given the right to buiid, own and operate 
f' 
a canal through Nicaragua. In ex~hange for the renuncia-
tion-0~ the bilateral nature of the old treaty Great Britain 
did request certain ·safeguards.' The first safeguard de-· 
manded that the'canal once built was to be perpetually 
neutral, "in times of war as in times.of peace." 5 This 
stipulation was not new wi~h the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, in 
fact the same principles were ~mbodied in the treaty that 
governed the Stiez Canal. 6 The secqnd safeguard called for 
all. nations to sign the agreement thus insuring neutrality 
by full international cooperation. The treaty also pro-
hibited fortification bf a?y type on the proposed ~anal. 7 
The United States ienate did not recei~e the Hay-
Pauncefote_Treaty before the spring recess of 1900,· but the 
~ Miller, Treaties. 
6 Grenville, "Britain and the Canal," p_. 57. 
7 Miller, Treaties. 
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very fact that they knew negotiations were going on was 
enough to ·again thwart John Tyler Morgan '.s attempt at pas.s-
·ing a Nicaragua canal Bill. Morgan att~mpted to introduce 
. . 
h~s bill during the 1899-1900 session, but the negotiations 
between ijay and Pauncefote: and the inv~stigation being con-
ducted by the Isthmian Canal Commission were both.used to 
block. consideration. 
The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was brought up for ratifi-
catiop in the early·.days. of the December 1900 session. 
Though this treaty like·all treaties was considered in ex-
ecutive or closed· se·ssion, the importance of the treaty was 
such that the chief.issues of the controversy were public 
knowledge, to anyone who read a new~paper. It was obvious 
from the·outset that the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty would not be 
. . 
ratified without amendment. The major stumbling block to 
rat1fication was the. prohibition· of fortification ·of the 
canal. Senator Davis led.the fight to amend this vortion 
of the treaty .. Davis introduced an amendment that.would 
allow the Unit~d States to f9rtify both ends of the canal 
and to t·ake any other action nedessary to insure the se-
curity of the area. Davis argued that once a .canal w·as 
built it would become a .se~tion of the United States.shore-
line, t.~e section that would be .mo.st likely attacked in 
ti~e of war. The Vnited S~ates had a_righ~ to protect its 
. t t d 't . f . 8 ~nves men an ~ S· terr~tory rom aggress~on. ·The treaty 
8 New· Yo:tk Times, December 13, 1900, p. ·1 •. 
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clause that called for international signatures met stiff 
opposition i.n the Senate too. ·. If the United States rati-
fied a treaty with such a clause included in it they would 
be obligated to compliance on· the issue of .neutrality. The 
rest of the world would .recognize the canal's neutrality 
only if they chose to sign the d?cument. The United States 
•. . 
would therefore place themselves in an inferior legal posi-
ti9n on a cana~ that· they had bui~t and operated. Davis 
found this situation intolerable. 9 · 
One ·group Qf Senators arg.ued throughout·· the debate 
that consideration of the _treaty was unnecessary because 
the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was invalid~ The United States 
had neither the obligation nor the right to consider this 
treaty;.consideration of the treaty granted a status to 
Great Britain over an.area to which she had no right. If 
· the United States· should ratify. the tre'aty and then· Great 
Britain rejected it· the United States ~ould have given them 
a status that th~y ha.d lost by the pass·age of time. 10 
Feelings on the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty were not divided 
along either party lines or route preference. Senator 
Morga11:· backed the Hay-Pauncefote T·reaty in the form origin-
ally proposed·. Mo:rgan opposed the Davis Amendment or any 
other amendments tha.t would jeopardize the speedy 
9 W. S. Holt, Treaties Defeated by the U.S. Senate, 
p. 23.1.' 
10 
"Views of ·the Minority," Senate Report 2402, S6th 
Congress, 2nd ssssion, pp. 2-9~ 
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ratification of the trea~y. To ~organ ·the treaty was a 
nicety, it allowed Great Britain to give up a claim that it 
was no lo!lger fully entitled to., without the·. loss of dip.lo-
matic prestige. The canal was ·to be built to promote com-
merce, and mili:tary considerati~YriS· such as fortificat-ions 
were too insignificant to hold up action according to 
. 11 Morgan. Morg~n's other reason was more important, it 
·wo.uld slow things up. Morgan argued· that the adoption of 
th~ Davis Amendment.would make the treaty unaccept~b.le to 
Great Britain and assure its·rej~ction in ·London. There-
jection .. of the treaty would mean further ne'gotiat.ions and 
resubmission of the document. In Morgan's eyes· anything 
that slowed down the can&l pro~ect wo~ked to the benefit of 
the Panama proponents and to the detriment of the Nicaragua 
forces. 12 
The Senate ratified the Hay.-Pauncefo.te Treaty just ·be-
fore the Christmas recess of 18.99. Despite the a~guments 
ahd warnings of Morgan an·d others the treaty was modified 
·by the DaYis Amendment and two others that.prov~d to be of-
fensive to the government in .London. Fortifications on the 
. . 
canal were to be allowed, and. the clause concerning an . 
. t t. 1 1 1' . d 13 h 1n erna 1ona agreement was a so e 1m1n.ate. • · T e treaty 
11 New York Times, December 6, 1901, p. 6. 
12. . 
. Radke, "Morgan," p. 21. 
13 Grenville, "Britain and the Canal,·" p. 68. 
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sent to Great Britain no longer represented a compromise, 
but a full surrender of principle if she w·ere to :ratify it. 
Secretary Hay· realiz.ed that. the treaty he had attempted 
to negotiate in·good faith was dead~ The Secretary was so 
14 
outraged that he thre'atened to resign his post. Though 
McKinley refused to accept the r.esignation, and. eyentually 
convinced him to stay his attituqe was partially respon-
sible for.the treaty's failure. McKinley at all times 
show~d co~plete confidence in Hay, but throughout the ne-
gotiations and the Senate debate ··:he used none of his influ-
ence to aid his Secretary.of State. Whil€ publicly asking 
for a fair treaty he claimed that to 't~ke any direct po-
litical action would be overstepping his perogatives~ 1 ? In 
weighing the President's statements on this it is important 
to remember that Senator Hanna, and others with great influ-
ence were in no hurry to: see any action ·favorable to the 
Ni.caragua route until the report of the Isthmian Canal Com-
mission was comp~eted. In fact it has been noted that 
M~rgan had better.access to the President than did many 
members of his own party, but on this question all inquiries 
16 
were turned directly over to Secretary Hay. President 
McKinley's role iri the .entire. canal controversy ·was re-
fleeted in his action at tnis time--the United States needs 
14 William Thayer, The Life of John Hay, pp. 226-227. 
15 Radke, "Morgan," p •. 16·. 
16 Ibid. , p. 18. 
• 
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a canal, but let the Congress decide the details. 
While McK~hley's attitude about the revised Hay-
Pauncefote Treaty was one of aloofness the re~ction in Great 
Britain was less restrairted·. Gr~at Bri~ain's initiat agree-
ment to. renegotiate the Clayt.on-Bulwer Treaty was closely 
intertwineq with her entir~ foreign policy. The years 
around the turn of the ·century were ones of transition· for 
the British Empire. . Great Britain was active,ly seeking 
fri~ndships abroad, and if they could not recruit any- new 
friends they wished to avoi~ any new.trouble spots. The 
reneg?tiation on the Clay~on-Bulwer Treaty was an attempt 
. 17 
to strengthen an amiable bond with the United States. 
Despite the British Government's realization that 
good relations with the United_States were necessary, the 
British press found 'the revised treaty appalling. The 
English newspapers edit?rialized that ·Great Britain would 
end up giving up everything and gain nothing in return if 
j. the amendments from the American Senate remained intact. 
I· The consensus seemed to be.that the United States was ar-
t 
rogant, greedy and aggressive in these demands, and if the 
London Government should ratify the agreement it would 
bring dishonor_to the.entire Empire. Occasionally in a 
.more moderate vein the Brit·ish .press pointed out that the 
United States did have a .bigger· ·Stake in a proposed canal 
I·. than Great Britain and therefore some safeguards .on her 
I 17 ·Grenville, "Britain and the Canal·,"' p. · 6 8. 
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part were tb be expected, but at no time did any paper de-· 
fend the treaty in the revised ·form, neither did any news-
18 paper recommend· that the government ra~ify the treaty. 
The semi-official or~r.an of the B:t;:"i tish Government, the · 
London Times, stated cat.egorically that the Salisbury Govern-
ment would reject the Hay-Paunce.fote Treaty and hold ·the. 
. . 19 . 
United· States to the CLayton-Bulwer Treaty. The British 
·.Government in an c;l.ttempt ·to modify the harsh tone o,f .The 
Times stated that the articl~· was based on pure spe~uiation, 
with no ·i~side informatibn.QO 
Despite the modification of The Times story by the 
government,·Henry Lansdowne, the British Fo~eign Secretary, 
knew upon. receipt of the amended treaty that his. government 
would have to reject it· in that form. At the same time he 
hoped to keep the. inevitable rejection a secret. fpr as long 
a.s possible. Lansdowne hoped in rejecting the treaty con-
taining the Davis· Ame~dment that a new treaty could be 
worked out with better terms .for Great Britain. The Foreign 
Secretary furt~er hoped that the new treaty would be less 
. . .. 21 
insulting ln tone. The amendments added-by the U.S. 
Senate left nothing f?r Great Britain and Lansdowne realized 




·New York Times, December 25, 1900, 4. p. 






it would·be disastrous for the ministry to ratify it. 
Great Britain's intent to keep their inevitable re-
jection secxet as long as possible served more than one 
purpose. Lansdowne pianned to keep the rejection a secret 
until the Senate adjourned in the Spring of l90L. This. 
would allow several months delay- 'before a new treaty could. 
·be worked out .. Delay wou~d hopefully·put Great Britain in 
a better ~arg~ining position,. provided ·that iri the mean~ 
time the situati·on in· South Africa and elsewhere came to a 
. . 22 
succe·ssful. conclusion. Lansdowne never lost sight of 
. . 
the internationai situation and Great Britain's fluctuating 
bargain.ing power. The Admiralty and other branches of the 
government ·al·so felt that any delay could work to. the bene·-
fit of the· Empire.. The military establishment in general 
and .the Admiralty. in particular was not ·anxious· to see the 
United States build a 9~nal across the Isthmus, especially 
one that would be solely controlled and fortified by the · 
United States. ~~le c~rtain segments of the London Govern-
ment saw a gradually growing.friendship and ineyitable ·al-
liance betwee·n the two nations, other gro·ups were more wary. 
During this period th~. Admiralty had gone as far as pre-
paring a c.ontingency plan to be used in ,case of war with. 
the United.Sta~es. 23 The military· argued tha~ while the 
Germans appeared to be the most dan9erous threat to Great 
22 Ibid. I p. 66. 
2 3 Ibid. 
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Britain,_ the United States and Great Britain had enough 
areas of overlapping interests that friction· between the 
·two powers could conceivably· result in open warfare •. The 
Canadian. Government a~so pushed fo_r delay in any treaty 
ratification until the ·ques~ion- of the.Alaska-Yukon boundary 
was settled. The Canadians wanted a_r~ciprocal agreement 
on this issue a.s ·part ·of any·· treaty ra-tification. 24. In 
fact when.L.ansdowrte asked·the various branches of the gov-
ernment to submi.t· a report of their fee~ings toward an 
American owned canal, only the report filed by. the Board of 
. . 
Trade wholeheartedly favored an immediate.American con-
f. • 25 
s.truct1on. 
While B~itish reaction to the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty 
was unfavorable, but\·primarily. after. the ratification,· 
United States newspapers·showed a P:r;'Ofound interest par-
ticularly .duri~g the debates q~ December 1900 •. Throughout 
the month of D~cember 1900, the debate on the treaty was 
front-page. news in such geographically different newspapers 
as the New York ·Times and the Daily Oregonian. Despite the 
close.d sessions both papers covered. the debate fully, and 
editorialized on the progress of the debate and on the 
major amendments~ 
The Davis Amendment took·up the mo'st space in the New 
York Times and the editorial reaction to it was negative .. 
24 c. c. Tonsill, Canadian-American Relations, p. 21s·. 
25 Grenville, .11 Britain· and the Canal," p .. 58. 
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The fortifi_cation suggested by the amendment and the wording 
were both condemned for bringing dishonor to the United 
States. The New· York Times went on to argue that the treaty 
as worked out by Hay and Pauncefote provided the United 
States all the ~uthority they needed to build a canal, and 
that all Great Britain wanted was the assurance of neu-
trali ty. · Gre.at Britain ·haq granted ·a great deal to the 
United s.tates ·.and .her request fpr guaranteed neutrality was 
·perfectly logical. The treaty if it adopted the Davis Amend-
ment would not. only reje.ct Great Britain·' s only real request 1. 
but would alter the entire meaning of the t~eaty. 26 The 
Times went .on to warn that the inciusion of any amendments 
that destroyed the neutrality of the ca~al would insure the· 
refusal of Great Britain to ratify the ·treaty. 27 The edi-
tors of the Times throug_hout the debate called upon the 
United States Senators to act like- statesmen for.the good 
of the American image and to guarantee British acceptance. 
Wh.en the Senate di9. ratify the treaty. in December 
1900 1 the New York paper did n'ot give up trying to salvage 
.what they considered a poor treaty. The editors while ad-
j· :mitting that the .SenB.;te had. destroyed much of the treaty, 
now argued that the Government of Great Britain should 
ratify it despite its weaknesses. The British Government 
was called ~pon to show a high degree of statesmanship in 
26 New York Times,. December .11, 1901, P·. 8. 
27 Ibid., December 201 1901, p. 8. 
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acceptin_g a treaty that had not treated them entirely 
fair. 28 Great Britain' s· statesmanship would not only serve 
as an example to our own Senate, but-could have even more 
far-reaching ramifications. · Acceptance of the treaty would 
be a giant step toward still better relations -between the 
. . 
two powers, an en·d that was hope~ for -by both the Ne,w York 
Times and the _editors of the Daily Oregonian. Rejection of 
th_e t:-reaty would be a victory· for the Anglophobes.· The 
Times saw a small but vocal group of Anglophobes still 
trying to keep the Unit~d Sta~es and Great Britain apart, 
and their cause would ·be boosted immeasurably if the treaty 
. d 29 were_re]ecte. Therefore the ramifications of reje~tion 
reached far beyond the issue·s in the treaty--Anglo-American 
relations woul_d face a severe and hard to overcome setback. 
Th~.newspapers saw the possible hand of yet another 
g;roup in the oppo~ition to the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty as 
.originaliy introduced--t:-he railroads. Several times.the 
New York. paper. questioned the ·role and motives of the rail-
roads in.the issue. Was an attempt being made by the trans-
continental lines to postpone the canal· or even to foil 
the ·project permanently, wonde.red the New York Times? 30 A 
canal ·could destroy what amounted- to the railroad's virtual 
f l shipping monopoly on·· goods in the United States, an~. it was 
i 
i 
l 28 Ibid., December 20, 1901, 6. p. 
29 Ibid., December 21, 19·01 1 1. ·p. 
30 
· Ibid. , December 20, '190"1, 6. p. 
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conurtoh. knowl.edge that this segment of the p~pulation di.d 
.not look favorably on·the project. Though it ~s true that 
the railroad .interests.were anti-canal, and.they fought 
h ' . . t . . 1 . 31 .. d h 32 f' t e proJec s 1n art1c es, sem1nars, an speec es or 
several years, the New York Times .never presented any proof 
·of covert action on. the· part qf: .:the railroad interes_ts. 
The paper did, however~ suggest that maybe the forces i.n 
favor of. Panama were s;imply r.ailroad men hoping to throw up 
. . 33 
a s~oke ·screen in an· attempt to destroy the whole proJect. 
While the Times did· feel that the United States 
·Senate .had acted poorly, anq that there. was a possibility 
of a railroad.conspiracy_they felt that the press of Great 
Britain was over-reacting to the treaty revisions. The 
editors .admonis.hed th~ British_ press £:or th~ir totally neg-
ative attitude towar.d the Senate debate ana the Senators' 
motives. Some of ·the backers of the Davis Amendment acted 
from firm .Political belief and not strictly from Anglo-
phobia. The United States Senate, the editors of the Times 
reminded the British press, wa~ not a group of one dimen-
sional bigots and chauvinists, co.mple.x issues ·were at stake 
31 ' . 
Joseph Nimmo, ."The Proposed American Interoceanic 
Canal in its Commercial Aspects," National Geographic 
Magazine XXIV, August,· 1899, pp. 297-310. 
32 
. Morgan Pape~s ·in the National Archives, vol. 11. 
Mo.rga.n col~ected speeches that both favored and· opposed 
not only Nicaragua, but all canals. Many. of. these he kept 
.with his private .paper~; 
33 
·New York Times, December 2"0 , 19 01, p. 6. 
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34 
and therefore complex considerations were nece_ssary. The 
New York paper was most vocal in its criticism of the Lon-
don _paper's attitude toward renegot~atLon. The Brftish 
press overwhelm~ngly favored no further attempts _at negoti-
ation. The Clayton.-Bulwer Treaty should rema~n the binding 
agreement between the two countries. The New York Times-
condemned this attitude as both unfriendly .and unrealistic. 
The United States and Great Britain must· update and ~~ne­
gotiate the Claytori-Bulwer Treaty because it was outmoded .. ·35 
The press of Great Britain was justified in disliking the 
Hay-Paunce~ote Trea~y as it came· out of the United States 
Senate, ~t was harsh and Unfair, but ~t the same time the 
papers must realize that.the Uniteq States must have some 
gua:r:antees for their project. The .e.stimated cost of. the 
Nicaraguan project was well in excess of $100 million ·and 
for that amount of money the investors could demand some 
rights and pr~vileges. 36· Th·e· New York Times in December 
.1900 had written that the Senate ·had acted in a short 
sighted an:c:I selfish manner,. even suggesting, that a con-
spiracy of businessmen had tried to shelve t~e ~hole project, 
yet· when the foreign· pre9s said ba.sically· the same thing 
in early 1901, the New York Times felt thfngs had gone too 
34 Ibid.·, December 25, 1901, '4. p. 
35 Ibid .. , January :18' 1901, 6. p. 
36 Ibid., February 271 1901, 8. p. 
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far. An American libe.ral newspaper had the. right to ·con-
dernn their c.ongress, b:ut the British press must be more 
circumspect. 
Soon after the British Government made public their 
rejection of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, ·Foreign Secretary 
Lansdowne and Lord. Pa.uncefote ag:reed to renegotiate ~ new 
treaty. One factor in this decision was reaction in the 
U:nited States .s~nate, which did lear.n ·of the rejection just 
before the recess, and immediately passed .a-resolution 
calling .for unilater·al abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer 
37 Treaty. 
The sit.uation elsewhere had not improved for the Bri-
tish, and thus their hopes of negotiating from new-found 
strength was not. for.thcoming. Despite the Senate' s reso-
lution, Lord P~~ncefote and Secretary Hay agreed to rene-
gotiate the treaty. Lord Pauncefote agreed to certain 
demands rejected in the earlier treaty: the New H~y­
Pauncefote Treaty include~ the wording that the treaty 
. . 
.would supersede, not just ~odi·fy, the: Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. 
. . 
The Ambassador realized that r_ather than weakening British 
.9'lobal ·prestige it would enhance it; Great·Britain would 
appear t<;> be ·~cting. in a statesmanlike·.manner. On the more 
practical side, Pauncefote realized that without such word-
ing the new treaty would· not make it through.a Senate. made 
3 7 Williams, Isthmian Diplomacy,. p. 30 7. Als-o Mine·r, 
Panama Route, p.· 109. 
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hostile by· the initial rejection. Hay and Pauncefote agreed 
to write t.he second treaty in such a manner that it would 
. . d' f.· t: 38 not requ1re. any Senate mo 1 1ca 1ons. At the initial 
meeting_ betwe~n the two men: it was· decided that the new 
treaty would not be dr_awn up unt;il .early f_all, to insure 
·its completion just before. the Senate reconvened in late 
1901. There would then.be less chance of the opposition 
rallying its fo.rces against. the treaty, and it ·also fel.l 
within the British idea that haste on this· issue was-not in 
the best interest of Great. Britain. 39 With these plans 
worked out, Hay left for his summ~r vacation and Lord 
Pauncefote prepared to move the embassy to Newport, Rhode 
Is land., :E:or the s :ummer. 
The change in British. attitude- a_s it was linked with 
the international political realities did. not improve in 
the summer of 1901~ 'The Boer War which had made them un-
popular throughout Eu_J.:"ope led to the British unpopula:t; ~-ty 
inqreasing not decrea~ing. To ~id their situatiort world-
wide, the cabinet decided to ease tensions in the .Caribbean 
area. The :Sriti.sh Foreign Office decided that the days ·of 
British domination and even parity had passed. irt. this part 
of the world. The United·.· States was going to be the power 
in. the Car:ibbean and there .was little if a:r:tything that .Gr.eat 
Britain cot(Ld do. The decision. ·was made to back out of the 
3 8 Williams, Ibid.'· p. 30 8. 
39 Grenville, "Britain and the Canal," p. 67. 
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area gracefully., both t.o save ·face and in the hope that it 
• 
would· strengthen .ties between the United ·.states and Great 
Britain. Despite the enmity of Canada over th.e failure to 
reaqh an agreement on the Alaska boU:ndary ·dispute, and the 
secret.Admiralty.report 9n de~enses against potentia~ war 
with the United.Statesi: the Fo~eign Office. decided that 
Germany and Russia were more li~ely to be the future 
enemies. 40 Great Britain decided to turn to the United 
States and her trad~t.ional enemy -France to seek ·.alliances 
to stave off the German threat. Worldwide considerations 
more than Ame~ican pressure were responsible .for the 
favorable Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. 
·The ne~ Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901 was written 
with an eye on the United States. Senate. The treaty con-. 
tained most of the guarantees that W?re included in the 
amendments· of the old tFeaty. Gone was any mention o.f an 
international agreement to be- signed by all' the countries 
of.the world to guarantee the canal'~ neutrality .. The 
agreement· gave· th~ Un_ited States .the ability to rule over 
. ' 
.a canal zone, and to take all .necessary steps, including 
fortification, to insure th~ safety of their investment in 
times ·of peace and war. The tre~ty included the principle 
of international neutrality, and guaranteed the ships of 
Great B~itain absolute parity with the ships of all other 
~ations. Ships of the United States ·obtained no special 
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pr~v~ eges·. 
The new treaty was ·submitted early in the December 
48 
1901 session and their was little of the fanfare or wr~ngling 
that was found the year before. The acquies~ence of Great 
Britain to.the terms, a~d the satisfactory wordi~g of the 
new document guaranteed ~qtification. _There was only.token 
opposition, and this came primqrily from those jingositic 
Sen~tors who continued to maintain that no treaty was .needed 
and the problem could be solved only through unilateral 
. ' 42 abrogat~on. Meanwhile the Panama proponent~ both in and 
more especia.~l.y .out of Congress hoped that .:the treaty would 
·meet with some obstacles while still calling unilateral 
abrogation ~ll~gal. .The more realistic p~oponents were 
resigne4 to t~e fact that: the treaty w~uld pass, and thus 
·they fell back on the argument that the Hay-Pauncefote 
·Tr~aty d{d. nothing to enhance the Nicaragua route vis-a-
vis the Panama route. 
Great Britain steppe9 aside as one. of the major ob-
stacles to a Nicaragua canal with their own .ratification 
of the second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, _but the delc;y of two 
years seriously hampered the Nicaraguan proponents. If 
. . ' 
the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty had not.b~en necessary or even 
if the first -one of December 1900 ~ad been ratified by bb~h 
.. ' 
parties quickly, the results might have been different. 
41· Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. 
42 New York Times, Decembe-r 17, 1901, p. 1. 
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The pro-Nicaraguan .ma.mentum that had been buildir:g for the 
previous years added to .the weight of the first Walker Com-
mission report might have carried through the Hepburn Bill 
de·spite the unfinished work of the Isthmian Canal Commission. 
The obstruction caused by the ex~s·tence ·of the Clayton-
Bulwer ·Treaty is not measurable .on any scale, but sho'uld 




The Haupt controversy concerning the role of the 
Panama forces .and the new canal commission died down by mid-
summer 1899 ·and the commissioners ·and their entourage set 
out for Paris. The trip to Paris w~~ to be a fact-finding 
mission. All records of the New·~renc~ Panama Canal Company 
were to be open. for the .commissioners' .inspection, the fi-:-
nancial as well as the·engineering documents. The promoters 
of the .sale of_ the Panama. concess·ion we.re _leaving· nothing 
to chance., there fore. Wi 11 iam Nelson Cromwell sailed for 
Paris a week before the second. Walker Commission did· in 
August, 1899. 1 
Gromwell' s 'journey to Paris was to establish a two-
pronged at~ack O!· the commission; first to insure that the· 
french effort to date in Panama was shown in ~he best pos-
_,sible light, and second to ~nsure that ·the charms of Paris 
did not go unnoticed by the members of· A.dmiral Walker's 
group. To this s-econd end_Cromwell organized receptions 
regularly. Parties were held in their honor almost nightly, 
resplendent with caviar, champagne and the finest food 
. . 2 
available, in the ·most elegant surr<?undings -~ Cromwell took 
great care to insure that none of the Americans suffered 
any ~n~onvenience. The facts on the ¢anal would speak for 
1 
"Story.of Panama," p. 153. 
2 Ibid., p. 152. 
i. 
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themselves, but pl~asant memories of the entire trip. would 
add a lasting favorable impression. Courtesy in all matters 
was both extended and graciously ackn~wledged. 
The special treatment pai'd off for the French. The 
final commission report to the Senate ·contained high pr.aise 
for every facet .of .the Paris· trip. .The commission report 
complimented the New French Panama Canal Company for the 
ef.ficiency .with which they c::arried out their dut~es. while 
.thanking. them for. their courtesy. Cromwell"s work had been 
done superbly. 3 
The New French Panama Canal Company prepa.red for the 
Walker Commission visit with the same ca_reful ·preparation 
that Cromwell had taken in setting ·up the social calendar. 
The .company officers had the prohlem of showing a solid 
responsible ·canal project,. that was for sale. If .the 
; . Panama venture w:as assured of success, why did the company 
wish to·sell·it? If the ~ompany di:d: wish t9 sell it~ could 
it be sold to another group at a reasonable price? These 
questions and others of the same typ~ had to be faced and 
·answered withont direc.tly dwellin.g on the infamous· role of 
the old comp.any. Though both the commissioners and the 
company officers knew .that. the fina~cial problems sprung 
from :the relatiop.ship between the ol·d company and the. new, 
the new company had to. promote .itself as entirely indepen-
dent from its scan.da,l-ridden predecessor. 












:The engineers ·and officers of the· company. showed the 
Walker Commission any d·ata reque.sted on. the .progress and 
forecasts on canal construction. Besides explaining the 
theories and accomplishments to date, the commission was 
provided with scores. of tables on su~h di.verse. matters as 
annual rainfall, jungle growth, ~ater tables, local building 
·materials and the type ang condition of construction equip-
ment available. 4 Complete inventories. of all equipment, 
buildings, and other propertie~ owned by the company were 
available with assessed valuations. .The company portrayed 
the project as one moving along at a reason~ble rate .toward 
_complet·ion. ·The comp~etion dc:ttes put f.orth by the Gompany 
were presented as feasible; an overall soundness of the· 
enterprise. was conveyed. ip all nhe documents and presenta-
tions. 
.The company also prepared statements on the issue of 
the concession they h_ad purchased from Colombia.. Questions 
had been raised.in the Un~ted S~ates, as early as 'the form~ 
ation of .the cormnission, on the legal s.tatus of the con:-
cession. All interested part~es were not in total agreement 
as to the transferability of the title from·the New French 
Panama Canal Company to another organization, let· alone to 
the government of a foreign power. Nicaragua canal sup-




on this point. 5 The company argued that the concession was 
valid and could be sold to an_y group or. orgaqization with 
which the company wished.to deal. 
The Walker Commission stayed in ~aris for about two 
· weeks to complete their investigations. While . in. Paris 
the commissioners talked not only to the canal company of-
ficials, but also to a group of inter.national engineers 
about the project. The-engineers who talked to the.Walker 
Commission were not chosen at random, rather they were 
carefully selected by Wi_l~iam Nelson ·cromwell. Several 
years earlier a group of engineers was assembled in Paris 
to study the possibility.·of a canal through Central America. 
The·international event was attended by engineers from 
France, Germany, G+eat Britain, Russia, and the United 
States. At the end of th~ meet~ng the engineers unanimously 
endorsed the Panama route as the most feasible one. Though 
the caliber of the_ participants was high, the meeting was 
not totally unbiased. As was later brought out in a Senate 
qommittee hear.ing, the. ·participants knew in advance that 
they were there to endorse the route chosen by.the· Fre~ch 
. 6 
company. The majority of the engineers who met with the 
Walker Commission during the'i.r tou:r: of Europe had taken 
5 Morgan Papers, vol .. 11 and several Senate Documents 
and Reports. 
6 
"Hearing from the Committee on Isthmian Canals," 
Senate'Document 50, 56th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 9-10. 
Hereafter cited Sen. Doc. 50. 
I 
I 
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part in this earlier. ·conference. 7 
One of the funct·ions. of the Walker· Conunission was to 
study the commercial advantages of having any canal ·at all. 
A special sub-committee of the commission was· appointed by· 
Admiral Walker,· as part of his instruct~ons from Congress, 
to study the question. With .. this .in mind the committee 
members visited several c~nals in Europe-to study both the 
physical o~eration and t~eir economic return. The canals 
at -Kiev, in Russia, one in· Germany, and ano.ther in Manchester 
8 England were given closest study. All three of these 
canalE? were financia.lly successful. The Manchester canal 
in· fact, had completely changed the economic structure of 
the a.rea by making an inland 'manuf9.cturing city an ocean-
. 9 
serving port.. The financial success of all the canals 
appeared to be a· solid argument for· a trans~sthmia.n c~nal, 
but the design and function of these European canals were 
ent~rely different from.'i:he proposed projects in Central 
America.· These European- canals had all been built to bring 
a city into the conunercial mainstream, not· to establish .. · 
and refine an international trade route. It was also noted 
that the canals built in Europe involved almost none of the 
engineering problems that wou~d be encountered in -~ canal 
7 Walker Report, 63. p. 
8 Ibid., 19. p. 
9 Ibid., 4. p .. 
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. . 10. 
project a~ either ·Panama, or N1caragua. Despite these 
major differences betwee.n canal types, the inspections . 
left a favorable impression on t~e committee members .. 
The Walker ·Comm_ission left E'lfrope in the late fall of 
1899 favorably impreE?sed with wha_t they had seen. French 
work at Panama seemed ts> be progtessing at a sound rate and 
the chances of a su_ccessful canal, at le.ast on paper, seemed 
.good. The. commercial potential seemed good; as all m~jor 
canals observed in Eur.ope made money. Though· the commis-
sioners· did not visit the Suez Canal the tre~endous financial 
su.ccess of that venture was public knowledge, arid a further · 
·reinforcement· for a. C?tnal'-project. The entire Suez project 
had paid for itself in relatively few years, and the annual 
return on.inves~ment was incredibly high at the turn of 
the century. .The findings of the Walker Commission at the 
point whe~ they left Europe were: the Panama proje~t looked 
feasible·, and a Central American canal appeared to be a 
db . . . . . 11· soun us·1ness ·1nvestll'l:ent. 
The Walker Commission left· Europe fo·r a brief stop- . 
over in the United s-tates and then-proceeded to Central Am..:. 
erica. To study_ the feasibility of the project ._in the 
time allote'd the Commission divided into two groups, one 
_group going to Nicaragua, and the· other going to Panama. 
The group that went to Nicaragua did not go just to review 
10 Ibid., pp. 17-20. 
ll Ib~d . 4'38. 
__ 1_., p. 
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the work of earlier surveys, but to make a new study. 
Though. all the .data from the Ludlow Survey, and· .the Nica-
raguan Canal Commission (the first Walker Commission)· Sur-
vey we~e re-investigated:, n~w enginee_rs were sent. to do'. 
thei·.r own survey. Rout.e changes, and. variations on pre-
viously discussed routes were ~tudi.ed. The econ.omic, po-
litical and health aspects of 't;hE? entire a.rea were again 
given close scrutiny. In. short, the team did not perform 
a ·formal rehash of earlier surveys, but a complete new 
12 
study. Professor Haupt., the most outspoken· advocate of 
the'Nicaraguan route accompanied this group, a fact that 
was to bear heavily in the forthcoming Senate debate. 
The second· group of commission~rs went directly to 
Panama. The New French Panama Canal Company, at the urging 
of Cromwell planned well for· ~eir arrival and stay. Crom-
well, who Left. Paris right after .the Walker party, took 
care to in·sure that e~erything went as sm,oothly in Panama 
as it had in Paris. 13 The commission members were to 
receive special tre_atment agai;n.· The company had. done 
their planning well, and the tours and briefings were 
. ' 
handled efficiently. The Fr.ench company. impressed all. the 
commissioners on the efficiency of their work. The ;panama 
study was handled in a dif~erent, but no less stringent 
manner than the study i~ ·Nicaragua. Since the cana-l was 
12
. Ibid., p. 3. 
13 





already under const.ruction, the route had alr.eady been 
settled. The New French .Panama Canal Comp·any maintained 
that. over -forty· pe.rcen.t of th~ work on the canal was . fin-
ished, a figure that seemed hi'gh to the Americans, though 
the commissioners admitted that a considerable amount.of 
work had been completed. Admiral Walker and his fellow com-
mission·ers carrie.d out a tl':loro~gh investigation of the pro-
ject, a·s ·wel.l as observing the work in· progress. As in 
the Nicaraguan study, engineers and scientists covered the 
terri~ory· completely .. Rock and so·il samples were tak.en 
and. analyzed, and the climate and water tables were· fully . 
investigated. Though a ·great deal of data was made avail-
able to the investigators by the French.· c·ompany, Walker and 
his party did most of .the .work.over again in an attempt to 
reach their own_ .conclusions·. 14·. Like th~ir counterparts. i.n 
· Nicaragu·a, the Panama·. te-am approached the project as some-
thing new and ·started at the beginning. 
While the COI:fllUissioners in Panama were investigating 
the project their social wants were being well. taken care 
of. The province of Panama had little of the charm of Paris, 
·nonetheless, the French made an effort to insure the GOm-
fort of the·American group. The best homes, carriages, . 
and railroad cars were placed at the Ame.ricans .' dispos.a.l. 
Guides,·well versed in ~1~ phases of the project were as-
signeO. to insure that. all went smoothly·. Parties and 
'14 Walker Report., p. 3. 
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dinners· were planned to honor the· men. Though the posit~ve 
. . 
aspects of· the project were accentuated, the French did ·not 
try to ¢lupe the commission members. The. Frenc·h wanted the 
Americans to see the project in its real light--a sound pro-
ject that could succeed ·Wi~h proper .financi~g. The French 
further realized ·that they w~re dealing with a blue ribbon 
commi.ttee that: would n~t be impressed or fooled by inflated 
progress reports. An opti~istic, but honest front was put 
' 15 
.forwa:r:d. . 
The Walker Commission after initial visits to.both 
Panama and Nic,aragua, as well as shorter trips· to less pub-
licized possible. route areas, released a preliminary re-
.. port. This initial r~port dealt primarily with the ·Nicar-
agua route. Morgan and his allies were· delight-ed with the 
report's as~ertion that the proj~ct was completely ·fea-
. 16 
. sible.. The Sena.te ~ommittee on Interoceanic· Canals, as 
it had been renamed ·after the Un.ited States began inve.sti-
gating the Panama route,· held hearings and invited the 
members of the commission who had worked in Nicaragua. 
The committee, under the watchful leadership of Morgan, 
attempted to shed fc;tvoraQle ,light on the project. Thos·e · 
·members of the commission· mos·t favorable to Nicaragua were 
ques.tioned by Morgan in a manner that would promot~ the 
15 . 
·"Story of Panama," p. 155. 
16 





project. 17 While Morgan took the lead. in questioning each 
witness; the other members of the committee also showed 
deep interest. They aske.d the witnesses technical ques-
tioris that reflected considerable research into the project •. 
. Though Morgan and Hanna seemed to dominate the meetings, 
several other Senators did show an interest. Questions 
duririg thes~ hearings, he·ld .in early May 1900,. centered 
around climatic conditions, soils and exact ro.ute recom.:.. 
mendation~ While paying ·lip service to an ~pe'n mind on the 
issue, the majority of the committee sympathized with the 
N . t 18 ' . 1.carag':la rc:>u e. 
Beside members of the W.alker Commis.s ion, experts. from 
a variety of fields also testified. The .committee brought 
as witnesses ·doctors who·spec~alized in tropical disease 
to comment on the situation in' both countries.· ~any of 
the doctors contende~ that· Nicaragua's climate· was better 
suited for the type of work to be· done. Yellow fever, 
malaria and the other prominent dise?ses of the area were 
shown to strike whites with much more frequency in Pan·ama 
than in Nicaragua. Though ~oth countries were in the 
t~opics_, . the doctors testi.fied that the· jungles of Panama 
were s ta tis tically much deadlier. At Morgan' ·s behest, 
socia.l. scientists, economists an~ people· with business con-
tacts in the two areas also testified before the committee. 
17 Sen. Doc. 50~ 










:These expe~ts agreed that Nicaragua was ~ better location 
from the standpo~nt of labor. The natives of Nicaragua 
were sa~d to be more ambitious·,· healthier and more stable 
than their counterparts in Panama. These and other lesser 
arguments were not new to the inv~st~gations of 1900, nor 
. . . 
did they settle the issues at ha.nd, but they were .dis-
19 
cussed. . Morgan in 1900, as he had been doing. for almost 
two decades, brought in anyorie who would tesfify to the 
benefits of building a canal through Nicaragua. 
· The ques.t:lon of earthquakes, · and volcanic eruption 
were not ignored by the committee. The whole area was made 
up of volcanic m~untain chains, and earthqu~kes were reg-
ular occurences on the isthmus. The testimony touched 
heavily on th~. earthquake damage to Panama City, and Colon, 
while pointing out that the proposed route through Southern 
Nicaragua was relatively free of danger. Volcan·ic activi_ty 
did not concern the geologists who testified. Nicaragua 
possessed s_everal volcan:Lc. peaks, but ~ost were. inactive, 
and those that did still erupt were hundreds of miles from 
the. s·ite of the canal route. 20 These geqlogists, like all 
the experts who testified were not the first to ~~ve evi-
dence,. but their evidence was similar to the predecessors. 
They asserted that there was a~ways danger 0f some earth-
quakes. due to. the large fault that ran the le~gth of the 
). 9 ·Ibid .. 
20. 
Walker ·Report, p. 1_3,7. 
I 
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isthmus, and while the chain of mountains was volcanic, 
danger of erup~ion at either site was -roi~irna1. 21 
61 
Th~- _committee on Interocean_ic Canals. also questioned 
proponents of the Panama Canal. One of the first witnesses 
questione.d was. the Arne:t;ican engineer who had served on. the 
Paris Committee to study ~anal .p~~jects in the nineties. 
The gentl~rn~n wa~ a former General in the Army Corps ~f 
E~gineers, and at the tim~ of the interview,. the leader of 
·severa~ proposed projects in the ~pper Midwest. The General 
had already gone on recor.d in .favor of the Panama route, 
and his convictions were ~tre~gthened by his belief.that 
1 b .. d . h . th 22 rea progress was e~ng rna e on·t e 1s rnus. The General. 
was tre.ated by most of the committee as an honored guest. 
He was asked the same kind of extensive intelligent ques-
tion·s that were asked to· the members of the Walker Gorn-
mission.· Senator Morgan•s attitude differed-. Morgan ques-
tioned the General' as if it were a trial. He seemed to 
feel that anyone who ~ould favor the Panama route was an 
agent of a foreign power. The fa_v:oring of a Nicaragua 
route had by this time become an obsession on ·an almost 
religious plane, al).d his opponents became infi_dels •. 
Though Morgan treated the engineer rudely, he saved 
his rea_l wrath for two-additional witnesses, the Director 
ti 
General of the New French Panama Canal Cornpa~y, Maurice· · 
21 
.Ibid. 









Hutin, and his chief legal. counsel, William Nelson Cromwell. 
Morgan ~tta·cked Cromw~ll like a prosecutor attacking a 
. . 
felon. The Alabama Senator showed open disbelief for Crom-
well's data,_ and at the same time impugned the attorney's 
t · 2 3 · n· · t M ' f · h · t th mo 1v~s. esp~ e organ s years o re~earc 1n o e 
canal issue and his ability as·an o~ator, he d~d not des-
troy the Panama project as he hoped. Cromwell was an even 
match. Cromwell never .. waivered· from his projections on the 
canal's progress, and feasibility d~spite the pressure from 
Morgan. As ·to the· questions concerning his own functions 
and duties, these·too he handled well, if somewhat eva-
s~vely. Cromwell appeared to be ~master of.his craft, 
relying on his legal mind, and his skill as a negotiator 
to handle all attac~s. He used the. defense of client-
. . 
attorney relationship several times to thwart Morgan's 
prying. His methods were both legally correct, and sue-
cessful. · If Morgan's aim was to. discredit either the at-
torney or- the project he failed. Cromwe.ll ~as a legiti-




At the same. time that· Cromwell testified befor_e the 
cqmmittee, so did Maurice Hutin t~e Director Generai of 
the New French Panama.Canal Company. Hutin's· testimony 
was limited by his inability ··to speak any English. Thus 
"23 Ibid., p. · 314. 
24 Ibid. , p ·· 319 • 
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he filed a brief statement, and agreed to answer in wri~ing 
·any.questions submitted, the answers would be submitted the 
following day. Hutin.then agreed to answer a few simpl~ 
questions through .an. interpreter. Hutin, like the American 
engineer, anq Cromwell, faced Morgan's hostility. Morgan's 
lightly veiled·accusations suggested the Panama project· 
25 . 
was a bili of goods. Hutin stated that he .came to testify 
in an effort to be helpful, adding th.at the concession 
·might be for sale if the proper arrangements could be made. 
The Director General also re-affirmed the. s·aleability of 
the concession as it stood. Hutin fel~ .there was no agree-
ment with.the.Bogota Government that prohibited the sale 
to anyone. 26 
While the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals was 
questioning witn~sses .on the feasibility ?f the two ~cutes 
and othe~ preliminary matters, things had· progressed much 
farther in t;:}).e House of Representatives.. With the quest ;ion 
of authorship of the bill settled with Morgan's· agreement 
in 18·9·9 to· allow Hepburn of Iowa to author the bili, the 
b .;ll d 1 . dl 27 . 1 . d ~ move a ong rap1 y. As prev1ous y mentJ.one , Hep~ 
burn was not from a commercial s·tat~ that would be directly 
affected· by one route or the other, rather his. j i:ngo:lsm 1 
and his ego demanded a Nicaragua route. It seems clear 
25 Ibid. I 321. p. 
26 Ib.id. I 322. p .. 






that one othe~ factor forced his demand for authorship, 
his Republicanism. Hepburn in earlier proceedings had in-
sisted that no money go to the.Mariti~e Canal Company be-. 
. . 
cause the McKinley Administration opposed pay~ng out any 
. th .. t f . 28 money to e pr~va e or a concess~on. H~pburn felt that 
the.canal. was· going to be one of t~e great accomplishme~ts · 
of the era, and a Republican, not a Democrat should have 
his name on the bill that authorized it. 29 Though Morga~ 
wanted· the bill under his name ·to boost his own ego, he 
realized after the Hous~ rejection of his 1898 biil that 
it was hopeless under his name. Morgan. dec;ided to allow 
H~pburn the authorship, because building the canal was the 
most important thing. 
· Hepburn was as anxious as his counterparts in the 
Senate to p~oceed.with haste •. He planned to send a biil 
through the.House during the early days of the Winter 1899-· 
1900 session, so it cou~d get final Senate hearings the 
same session. The Hepburn Bill called for the.'Ownership 
and construction of ·a canal through N'icaragua by the. gov-
ernment of the United States. The bill likewise made pro-
visions for ample funds to insure the completion of the 
proj~ct, but did not include any mention of reimbursement 
for the Maritime. Canai Company, nor any mention of. waiting 
upon the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, still in negotiation between 
·28 Ibid •. , p. ·11. 
29· Ibid. , ·p. 17 .. 
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the United States and Great Britain. 30 
Hepbu~n's Bill was r~c9mmended out of the Commerce 
c.o~ittee with .relative ·ease, but immediately ran into 
stiff opposition on the flqor of th.e entire House.. Among 
the opponents of hasty.consideration of the bill was· 
Representative Joe Cannon of Il~inois. Cannon, who was 
later one of the.most powerful and dictatorial of ·all the 
House S~eakers, was the ~~publican ·chairman of the House 
Appropriations Committee .. Cannon '·s major ally in this op-. 
position was ·Representative Burton, another Illinois Re-
publican. Illinois, ·like Iowa and the rest of the Central 
Mi'dwest was railro0;d country, .and though no direct'link 
between the railroad lobbies· and the bill's opponents was 
ever shown, the. accusations existed. 
Representatives Burton and Cannon argued that the 
Hepburn Bill was premCl:ture for· two. reasons: first the · 
~ay-Pauncefote Tre~ty was still being negotiated, and s_ec-
ondly the Walker Conunission had not finished- their inves-
tigations and given ·tbeir final report. Hepburn answered 
the first objection by stat~ng thai the United States 
should unilaterally abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 
which was obsolete,·and probably i~legal from the ·outset. 
The Ludlow Commission of. 1895; and the. first Walker Com-
. mission: of 1897-l899 had bo:th ··favored the route recommended 
in his. hill, and a~y waiting for yet another survey· in the· 
30 G~enville, "Brifain and the Canal," pp. 52-53~ 
66 
same decade was a stalling tactic. Hepburn implied that 
there might be ~ome·ult~rior motives behind those who 
. 31 favored furthe~ delay~. 
The debate between the Hepburn supporters( and those 
who felt that not all·the inform~tion had been gathered 
was drawn out and bitter. The m~jor participants in the 
debate all made lengthy speeches filled with statistics to 
support ~heir positions .. Data of both a scienti~ic and 
historical nature "fortitied the positions on both sides. 
Hepburn called_upon Congress to make haste in selecting 
the Nicaragua canal, the "American route." The Panama 
route was described as the 11 French route," implying not 
only European imperialism,. but .also the scandal.that· had 
·. 32 
:rocked the ~sthmus during the first company '.s ex1.stence. 
The oppo~ents of the bill argued for patience and practi-
cality. Cannon and his allies did not argue against a . 
. canal, on the contrary all the.speakers who talk~d against. 
the Hepburn Bill went on record in favor of a canal. 
Burton and Cannon, like Hanna in the s,enate, felt the pro-
ject must be approa9hed in a business-like. manner; the 
economic and c::ommercia.l potential of all routes must be 
33 thoroughly scrutinized before a·final route was chosen. 
31 Congressional Record, v .. 33, pt. 6., 56th Congress, 
1st· Session, House, p. 4945. 
32 Ibid. , p • 5 0 0 5 . 
33 Ibid ~ , p . 4 9 14 • 
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Hepburn again countered that all the·pieliminary work nee-
essary had been done in the numerous surveys already com~ 
pleted, and tha·t. P.atriotis.m demanded immediate .action. 
The fact that the Hay-Pau~cefote Treaty was still being 
negotiated and that the ·congress had appropriated over a 
. . 
mill;ion dollars to est:ablish the second Wal.ker Commission 
proved that the preliminary studies w~re not completed 
argQed the bill's opponents: ~he oppon~nt~ also called 
on the House membership to look at· practical business 
r:eali ties in deciding· the issue, and warned against being • 
swayed by w.ild rhetoric.. The debate was interspersed with 
a series. of name-calling episodes, and occasionally one of 1 
the proponents would.be ~ewarded with outbursts of de-
risive laughter aimed at his opponents. 
Despite the length and the intensity of the debate 
in the House and the positions of power held by the oppo-
sition leaders, th~ outcome was ri~ver in doubt. The House 
of Repres·entatives passed the Hepburn Bill by. a:q. over-
·34 
whelming majority and seri.t.it .on t.o the Senate. Repre-
sentative Cannon, and his allies in the end supported the 
bill, showing that they did in fact·want a ~anal, but they 
were not total~y committed to that bili, at· that time. 
Morgan now set about the task of getting passage of 
the bill in the Senate as soon.as possible. His calling 
of the various members of· the Walker Commission, and other 
3 4 Ibid. , p . 50 1"1. 
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w i t n e s s e s  i n  t h e  S p r i n g . o f  1 9 0 0 ,  w a s  t o  f u r t h e r  . t h i s . a i m .  
T h e  H e p b u r n  B i l l  d i d  r e c e i v e  t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  · t h e  S e n a t e  
C o m m i t t e e  o n . I n t e r o c e a n i c  C a n a l s ,  w h e r e . i t  w a s  r e c o m m e n d e d  
f a v o r a b l y  i n  M a y  1 9 0 0 ,  b~t i t  w a s  t o o  l a t e  f o r  consider~-
t i o n  b e f o r · e  t h e  . s u m m e r  a d j o u r n m e n t .  T h e  A l a b a m a  S e n a t o r  
w a s  d i s c o u r a g e d  b y  t h i s  t u r n  · < ? f  · e v e n t s ,  b u t  h e ·  n o n e t h e l e s s  
a t t e m p t e d  t o  g e t  e a r l y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  a f t e r  t h e  S e n a t e  r e -
c o n v e n e d  i n  t h e  f a l l .  H e  h o p e d  t o  h a v e  t h e  b i l i  p a s s e d  a n d  
s i g n e d  n o  l a t e r  t h . a n  e a r l y  w i n t e r  1 9 . 0 1 ,  b e f o r · e  t h e  C o n g r e s s  
a d j o u r n e d  f o r  t h e  M a r c h  i n a u g u r a t i o n .  
W h e ' n  C o n g r e s s  r e c o n v e n e d .  i n  D e c e m b e r  1 9 0 0  I  M o r g a n  
a s k e d  t h a t  t h e  H e p b u r n  B i l l  b e  p l a c e d  o n  t h e  c a l e n d a r  f o r  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  S e n a t o r  W i l l i a m  A l l i s o n ,  t h e  R e p u b l i c a n  
C h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  O r d e r  o f  B u s i n e s s  C 9 m m i t t e e ,  r u l e d  t h a t  a p -
p r o p r i a t i o n  b i l l s  c a r r i e d  f i r s t  p r i o r i t y  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  
t h e r e  c o u l d  b e  n o  guaran~ee·o~ a .  s p o t  o n  t h e  c a l e n d a r  f o r  
t h e  c a n a l  b i l l .  
3 5  
.  T h e  p r i r r { a · r y  a p p r _ o p r i a t i o n  b i l l  t o  b e ·  
c o n s i d e r e d  a t  t h e ·  t i m e  w a s  the·R~ver a n d  Ha~bor B i l l ,  a  
b i l l  o f  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  t o  ~enator ~ann~. A f t e r  t h e  
C h r i s t m a s  r e c e s s ,  J a n u a r y  s t a r t e d  s l i p p i n g  i n t o  F e b r u a r y ,  
a n d  t h e  d a y s  b e f . o r e  t h e  i n a u g u r a l  a d j ' o u r n m e n t  g o t  s h o r ' t e r  
a n d  s h o r t e r .  M o r g a n  t h e n  t r e i d  t o  d e m a n d  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o n  
t h e  b~sis t h a t  t h e  b i l l  w a s  o l d  b u s i n e s s .  H e  r e s t e d  t h i s  
c l a i m  o n  t h e  b a s i s  t h a t  t h e  H e p b u r n  B i l l  h a d  p a s s e d  t h r o u g h  
t h e  C o m m i t t e e  o n  I n t e r o c e a n i c  C a n a l s  d u r i n g  t h e  p r e v i o u s  
3 5  
M i n e r ,  P a n a m a  R o u t e ,  . .  p .  1 0 0 .  A l s o  R a d k e ,  " M o r g a n , "  
p .  2  4 .  
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session. Again the Republican leadership of the Senate dis-
agreed, s·tating. that Moi;'gan' s bilt must get special con-
sideration of the Senate to be handled at that session. 
Morgan -~sked for unanimous consent that the can~l bill be. 
place_d on the calendar, _but Senator Henry Cabot Lodge,· the 
·Republican from Massachusett~,_. objected, and spec·ial con-
sideration was denied. Thus Morgan's .final attemp:t to get 
consideration from that Congress was .thwarted. 36 Senator 
Hanna's influence among the Republican leadership was too 
st:r'Orig. for Morgan to overco~e, and the pro-Nicaragua for.ces 
in the Senate were not as strong. as their counterparts in 
the House of Representatives. The Panama advocates had 
successfully stalled ~n the spring of 1901. 
A plethora of c-ircumstances arose to block Senate 
consideration of the Hepburn Bill during the.years 1900~ 
i90l. The. fact that the bil~ did not _reach. the Senate 
until near the end of the spring session of 1900 made the 
ini ti~l holdover almost inevitable. The uncertain .st.atus 
of the Hay-Paunqefote Treaty,' which the Senate did not even 
i· ·ra~ify initially until the fall of 1901 slowed up the bill 
during the winter 1900-1901 sessi.on. A combin.ation of pro-
Panama sen~iments, and Senator Hanna's interest in the 
River· and Harbor Bill, eased. the N.icar·agD:a legislation off 
of the calendar. St{ll the Hepburn Bill might have re-
ceived considera.tion, but some of the most influential 





Senators including Lodge and Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island 
opposed such a move in the waning daY.s of the sessi,on. 
To the qorobination of the pro::-Pap.ama Senators,. and 
pending Senate business was·added·another blow to Morgan's 
cause, the refusal of Great Britain to ratify the amended 
version of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. There is little 
doubt.that a plurality. of the United States Senate favored 
the Nicaragua ro~te over any·other route in the spring of 
i90l, but enough other Senators either favored Panama, were 
. . 
awaiting the final Walker Commission Report, or felt that 
the Hay-Pauncefote. Treaty controversy must be satisfac~ 
torily sett~ed before acti?n·co~ld be taken on the Hepburn 
Bill, to kill the bill at that time. When the Senate met 
for the special session after McKinley's second inaugura-
tion, Morgan called for a Senate resolution to·· unilaterally 
abro-gate. the Clayton-Bulw.er Treaty. Though the. resolution 
did pass, the Senate adjourned-and negotiations between 
the· U.S. and Great Britain conti~ued. 37 
The summer of 1901 arrived with no Nicaragua Canal 
Bill, and no. final report from the Second.Walker Commis-
sion. Lord Pauncefote, who had agre~d in principle t6 · 
meet with Hay· before the .next session of Congress. to .write 
a new agre~ment left fo~ England, later to rejoin his 
embassy in their Newport summer residence·. Though no new 
3 7 







treaty had been wrftten, it was just a matter of time·. 38 
Hay, bitterly disappointe_d in the fate. of his treaty, took 
a lengthy vacation_ during the.summer of 1901, while Presi-
dent McKinley took a trip to Buffalo·, New York, to attend 
an international exposition. Whi.le shaking hands. at a 
. . 
receiving line at .the exposition,- McKinley was shot by an 
anarchist.· The shots, though first thought to be minor, 
proved "fatal. McKinley's replacement as P!esident, Theo-
dor~ Roosevelt, had a different view of the canal project 
than his predecesso~. While still Governor of New York in 
1899, Roosevelt had demanded some action .be taken to in-
sure the United States a concession on the isthmus·. 39 
Roosevelt, a st~ong believer in sea power,·had no 1nten-
tion·of sitting back and letting things materialize on the 
canal question. H~ was· a man who liked action. 
38 Grenville, "Br.itain and the Canal," pp. 63-67. 
39 New York Times, August 17, 1899. 
CHAPTER IV 
By the early fall of 1901. the shock of President 
McKinley's assassination had sunk in and .then slowly faded 
away as the nation trie·O: to return to normal. The new · 
President made no immediate changes in the administr·ation 1. 
. ' 
all cabinet members were asked to stay, and did so .. Sec-
retary of-State Hay, with Roosevelt's concurrence, did 
.meet with the-British Amba~sador as previously planned, 
and a· ne~ Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was written wit~ the goal 
of sure Senate acceptance. The new treaty, submitted early 
in the opening session of the I).ew Congress, met with little 
resistance an~ qu~ck ratific~tion eliminated this long-
standing obstacle to the Nicaragua cana1. 1 
.Two months before final ratification of the second 
-Hay-Pauncefote Tre~ty proponents of the Nicar~gua·canal . 
route received an even larger boost; the· final publication 
of the Isthmian Canal Commission repo'rt was released in 
October 1901. The Commis·sion recommended that ·the United· 
States. build its ca.nal through Nicara9ua. 2 ·The Second 
Walker Commission, like the Ludlow Commission~, and,the 
First Walker Commiss l.on, .saw the enginee-ring and geological 
pro~.lems as solveab~e, and_ the project as feasible with. 
available knowledge and equipment. The report estimated 
1 Congressional. Record, vol. 35, 57th Congress, lst 
_Session, Senate, pp. 314-315. 





that the cos.t :of the project would be higher than reported 
. in 1899 at a cost of close to $190 million versus an 
earlier estimated cost o~ ap~roximately $115 million. 3. 
Though the selection ·of the Nicaragua route was re-
ceived with joy by the proponents of the route, the out-· 
come was expected by many. ·sena~or Morgan anticipated the 
outcome. His anticipation was based partially on_ a letter 
·he had received from Admiral Walker in the spring of 1900. 
Walker's letter had optimistically predicted that the 
Alabama Senator would see his bill as law by Christmas, 
1900. 4 Though the date suggested by.the Admiral's esti-
mate had been premature., Morgan was· convinced by the late 
fall of 190l·that his years of labor were about to hear· 
fruit. Secretary Hay .in anticipation of the outcome had 
met wit.h the Nicaraguan Minister in Was'hington in D.ecemb.er. 
1900. The m.eetings took. place. to set up a protocol agree-
ment that would establish pro9edure for any further agree-· 
. . 5 
ments between the two countries. The protocol was· sig~ed 
. / 
in 1900 py both Hay and the Nicaraguan Charge d' affaires. 
No action was taken on the .agreement at the time because 
Hay felt.that it would violate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 
~hich was. stili ·in effect. The proposed canal route would 
3 Ibid·., p. 12 .. 
4 Radke, "Morgan," .p. 22. 
5 
_''Views of the Minority,-" Senate Report 2402, 56th 
Congress,· lst Session, hereafter cited as "Views of the · 
Mino;rity," pp. 4-5. 
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r~n along the San Juan del Norte River, which made up the 
border betw·een Nicaragua and Costa Rica, therE;? fore Secre-
tary Hay aiso met with. the Charg~ d' affai~es of Costa Rica 
to work out a protocol agreeme~t with that country. The 
documents with each country for a11 intents and purposes 
were identica1. 6 
While the Walker Commission did recommend the Nicar-
agua route it did not downgrade ·the Panama proj.ect. All 
.the American engineers, who took part in ·the intensive in-
vestigation of the project agreed to its.feasibility. A 
Panama canal would ~e approx~mately forty-nine miles long 
fro~ ocean ~o. ocean wherea% the Nicaragua route would be 
about one hundred and eighty miles·long. The diffeLence 
in length would s.eriously· affect trave·l time between the 
t~o routes. A ship would take nine to fifteen hours to 
pass through the Panama canal, but the same sh.ip would take 
over a day to get through Nicaragua. The Walker c·ommis-
sion also felt that. the work would be completed sooner· in 
.Panama. Construction had begun and equipment and· men were 
in place at Panama, while only preliminary surveys had . 
1. been completed' in Nicara9ua. The. report also ·estimated a 
I lowe:J; maintenance cost in Panama than in Ni~aragua·. 7 
Despite the projected advant,ages mentioned in favor 
of Panama, there was one serious disadvantage--cost. When 
6 Ibid. , p. 5. 





the New French Panama Canal Compa.ny had s~nt out its first 
feelers about a poss-ible sale of the 9oncession ,, the price 
·asked was astronomical.. The company _wanted a cash sett.le-
ment for the equipment and work qone, plus money for the 
conce~sion, and finally special reirnburse~ent ag~inst the 
loss of potential revenue they w.ould have earned i.f they 
had finished the canal. The United States Government re-
acted to the first two demands by saying it would negotiate 
on'the price, the third d~mand was re~ected outright. 
Representatives of· the United States argued that no organ-
ization that sold its interest in a compa~y could expect 
a share of the profits after the sale. 8 The company rea·-
lized the weakness of the demand and dropped it as a cort-
dition.of_'negotiation. 
The New French Panama Canal Company set the value of 
.the concession, equipment and qompleted work at $110 million. 
The· Walker Commission estimated the value at $40 million. 
Several times du·ring ~he two. year li.fe of. t.he commission, 
Admiral Walker conferred or attempted· to confer with 
Director· General Hutin of the company to discuss the dif-
ferences in the price estimates. At no time during the 
~egotiations wa~ a compromis~·worked out. In fact, though 
~he figure of $~00 million was both mentioned and even jus-
tified fn writing., M. Hutin ·never set a firm· price. 9 This 
8
· Mack, Land bi vided, p •· 34 7. 
9 Walker Report, p. 10. 
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inability on the part of.the·two parties to settle on a 
price forced the Walker Commi~sion to recommend the Nic-
aragua route. The Nicaraguan canal p~oject would cost 
·$189 million including ·extra money to cover unforeseen 
.events, the total cost. for the Panama project was $14 4 
million or about $~5 million less. ~he French, however, 
had hinted at around $100 million for the work done and the 
concession, thus making the route more expensive by some 
$60 . '11' 10 m1 10n. 
The Walker Commission dealt with. one more important 
issue that would crop up throug:hout the route deb:a.te--the 
transferability pf the French conce~s~on. S~nator Morgan 
! . and many oti?-er opponents of the Panama route · argued that 
i 
1 the concession granted to. the two ~rench compan~e~ was 
not transferable.to another party, particularly a foreign 
power. ·. The Walker Commission saw th.is issue .as insignifi- · 
cant, whi~e argui?g. that the .best evidence seemed to sug-
h • 1 I f b ' 1 • 11 gest E e t1t e s trans era. 1 1ty. 
When the Walker Comrriis·sion recommended Nicaragua in 
October i90l, .and the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was. ratified· 
! . in December. of the same .year, Morgan's. position seemed in-
vincible. The anti-Nicaragua· forces who had insisted that 
these two is~ues be· reso,lved before .further action be 
taken, had run out of ammunition. The job of the commission 
·10 Ibid., p. 13. 
11 Ibid. I 6 8. ·p. 
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met with the approval of much o.f the press. The New York 
Times co·ngratulated Admiral Walker and his associates fo.r 
the ~xcellent job they .had don~. The .newspaper compli-
mented the me.n particularly .on the high quality and 
thoroughness of tb~ re.search, and the unbiased nature of 
the work·and the conclusions. The paper.appeared pleased 
with the selection of the Nicaragua rout.e, and saw the 
~eport~s completion as the final defeat of the leaders of 
the anti-canal forces, the rai~road lobbies. 12 A feeling 
still exist~d in the fall of 1901 among certain·groups that 
the whole Panama investigation had been .an attempt to 
l. ! either slow up. or destroy any American canal .proj.ect. 
Therefore the selection of the Nicaragua,n, or "American" 
route brought a sense of relief to these people. 
Despite the double boost the Nicaragua project received 
in late 1901, ·senator .. Morgan and his allies did ·not allow 
themselves to.bec6me trapped into a false feeling of·con~· 
fidence. His dream of an American-owned canal located in 
Nic·aragua to aid the economic: resurgence· of .the S.outh had 
been thwarted too many times to allow inaction. The Senate 
Committee on an Interoceanic Canal immediately scheduled 
hearings .to bring home th~ full brunt of the commission's 
recommendations. Members of the Walker Commission were 
·once again invited to appear and reiterate their· :f·indings. 
The pro-Nicaragua forces gea~ed up for a final onslaught 











by prepa~.ing all the best testimony available. Legal ex-
perts were also invited to discuss the Wyse Concession, as 
the· French concession was c.alled. These experts all agreed 
they had grave reservations about it. 13 Mor·gan· intended 
to accent the positive events of the last several months 
while further discrediting the P~nama forces. 
The recommendation of the Nicaragua route by the 
Walker Commissiol'). came as a crus.hing· blow to Philippe 
Bunau-Varilla. The French engineer saw this as n.early 
fatal to his dream of a Panama canal, and a death ·blow to 
his hopes of recovering at least some of his two million 
francs. Bunau-Varilla,·like his oppone~t Morgan, was not 
a man to stop fighting_despite the serious .setback. The 
New French Panama Canal Company had-scheduled its annual 
stockholders' meeting for the third week in December,. 1901, 
.and Bunau-Varill~:saw this as the last .chance to arrange 
the sale. The French courts in ·the bankruptcy d~cisions 
of 1894 had ruled that any major participants in the old 
company could not take an .active role in the new company. 
This made it impossible for Bunau-Varilla to attend the 
meeting ·as a voting stockholder. The wily Frenchman was 
too desperate to let .a court ruling deprive him of this 
last ch~nce, fortunately his brother, another involunta~y 
investor in the new company,· was. a newspaper owner and 
could get Bunau-Varilla a press pass for the upcoming 




The findings of the Walker Commission had sounded a 
death knell tor Panama that was heard by more than just. 
Philippe Bunau-Varilla. Many of the other stockholders 
I 
t , 
realized that ~nless something were done soon ~he United 
States w~uld purchase a concession from Nicaragua and Costa 
Ricq and begin a canal, thus almost assuredly dooming any 
chance for ·their cana 1. Wi t.h this gloomy 'thought in the 
minds of most of those stockholders in attendanc~, chaos 
reigned from the outset of the meeting. 15 Bunau-Varilla, 
though only a reporter, managed. to be heard from the floor. 
The United States Governmnet was the only salyation of the 
Panama canal p;r-oject warned Bunau-Vari,lla. The company 
could not raise the funds to complete the canal through 
private sources, and the British had relinqu~shed any 
interest in the ·project with their ratification of the 
second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. The French Government would 
not intervene to buy the foundering conc~ssion, and even 
if she did the Pnited States would not sit iqly by while 
a European power attempted t6 move into the Western·Hemi-
sphere in .stich a large way.· The only other 9ountry with. 
resources to build a canal through Panama was the German 
Empire, and·no Frenchman could seriously entertain this 
notion_, the thirty year old wounds that dated back to ·the 
14 B.unau-Var.illa, Panama, p. 210. 
15 New York Times, December 25, 1901, p. 4. 
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. 16 . Franco-Prussian War had not healed yet. · The Un~ted 
States was the only country that cquld offer a way out. 
Bunau-Varilla continued by saying that the $40 million 
offer was the highest one they could expect. The Walker 
Commission report had. already been f.iled with the United 
States Congress,· and the· $40 million figure had been· in-
eluded, that recommendation would not be raised. It wa·s 
pointed out that the Walker Commission: had·tried with no 
succe.ss., as late as the first week in October 1901, to es-· 
tabli.sh .. a selling price. When Director· General Hutin 
refused to consider the $40 million offer, he forced Ad-
miral Walker and the Commission to recommend the Nic'aragua 
route. The American commission would not change their 
collective minds and reconsider unless there. were a change 
in the situation on the.part of the company. The company 
would. be. forced to lower its demand to $40 million. 17 
Despit~ Bunau-Varilla's spee~h, the meetiri~ was still 
badly split· between those who would sell at any price and 
those who would look for a way ·to get the $100 million. 
Director·General Hutin refused to consider such a small 
sum·, ·and ·led the forces who wished to hold out for the full· 
amount·.· Bunp.u-Varilla and his allies warned that further 
inaction·would be the ·canal company's ·undoing, not. only 
16 
.Bunau-Varilla, all.his major works refer con-
stant~y to·t~e evils .of the Germans. 
17 Bunau-.Varilla, Panama, p. 211. 
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would the price have to come down, but it must come ·down 
at once. An offer must be made to.the Walker Commission 
befo:r:e Cong.ress re~onvened after Christmas·. The confronta-
tion between those who wou~d sell and thbse.who would look 
for a better offer erupted into a full scale power struggle.· 
The majority of the ·Stockholders joined Bun·au-Varilla in 
a swift. ?rganizat,ional coup that ousted.Director General 
. . 
Hutin and the other O·fficers. The new ·slate. of officers 
immediately m~ved that an offer be made to the· United States 
Government to sett all the assets of the New French Panama 
Cana.l Company for the $40 million specified· by the Walker. 
Commission. The plan was. ·overwhelmingly adopted. 18 
Phi.lippe Bunau-V~ri.lla was triumphant, but not com-
placent. Bunau-Varilla insisted that the new .Director im-
mediately dispa.tch a telegram to Washington with the sales 
offer. The officers of the company, though willing to 
sell out at that· lower price, · refus.ed .. to move that quickly. 
Whether· they moved slowly because of a sense of wounded 
pride, or because they ·did.not share Bunau-Varil:la's sense 
of urgency is not clear, but they did write a letter to. 
. 19 
Admiral Walker with the ·new offer. Bunau-Varilla, not 
taking any chances, dispatched a telegram of his own that 
contained the new offer. Thus while Congress was out of 
session for the Christmas holidays of 190~-1902, the New· 
18 New York Times, January 6, 1902, p. 1. 
19 Miner, Panama Route, p. 119. 
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. -French Panama Canal Company official~y went up for sale ·at 
a price. that the Walker Commissio~ could and would recommend. 
While the United States was busy negotiating with 
Nicaragua, Cqsta Rica, and Great Brita.in over a possible 
canal through Nicaragua, and negotiating with a French 
company over a. possible Panama r?ute, ·the one ·other govern-
ment· that would become involved was· having int.ernal trou .... 
bles. Colombia, of which the Isthmus of Panama·was the 
northernmost prov_ince was in the ·middle of a civil war. 
The government, which had been ·shakey throughout most of 
the 1890's, had_ndw .split between two factions. The ~.eg­
ally elected president of the cotintry was under house ar-
rest out-side the national capital at Bogot~. The Colombian 
constitution stated if a president·were·out of the capital 
beyond a prescribed n~ber of days he forfeited his power. 
The country's vice-president had .used-this loophole to as-
d . 20 sume an reta1n power. The situation was further com-
plicated by a multitude of factors both political and 
I 
economic. The end result was political chaos and deep fi-
nancial problems. 
Despite the rag.\ng civil wa;r in Colombia, attention 
was being paiq to the negotiations and expeditions ln ·the 
province of Panama. Since its inco~poration into the 
country in ·the early days of the Republiq·, Panama had · 
always. been a frontier area. The Panamanians claimed with 
20 
E. T. ~arks, Colombia and the United States, p .. 159. 
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some justification that the government in Bogqt~ exploited 
the province because of the financial and.commercial ad-
vantages.of her geography. 2 l ·During this period of po-
litical and economic upheaval;· the national gove:rnment saw 
an-opportu~ity to exploit the ~~tuation throtigh their 
ability to grant and control canal concession~. If the 
New French Panama Canal Company were going to sell its con-
cession to the United States then· someone was going to pay 
a great deal of money to bolster the faltering Colombian 
treasury. 
During most of the final decade-of the nineteenth 
century Colombia .hCl.d no repre-sentative of ministerial rank 
in·washington, but when the United States showed a real 
interest in ~he Pa~ama ~anal project this situation was 
remedied. ·In April 1901 Colombia· sent Carlos Mart:lnez 
Silva,·· a highly· respected former· Forei-gn Mini·ster to· 
Wash:j_ngtori. as Min'ister Plenipotentiary. Though Dr .. Mart!nez 
had no instructions offic~ally to ·negotiat~ a protocol or 
treaty between the two countries he did send· out feelers. 22 
-D~. Ma~t!nez's position was that the concession couid be 
transferred intact from the New French Panama Canal Com-
pany to the Government of the United States, provided. that. 
'the United States ~et all deadlines as outlined in the 
21 Min·er, Panama Route, p .. 119. 
22 Ibid. I p . 10 5 • 
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. f .. f. . 1 . d . 2'3 Wyse·concess~on and or some ~nanc~a cons~ erat~on. 
\\Then Dr. Mart:lnez met with Secretary Hay to presen.t his 
credentials in the sprtng of. 1901 these preliminq..ry con-
ditions were discussed. .The situation changed· rather 
drast"ically, however, in June of 1901 with the abrupt 
dropping of communications between.Martinez and his gov-
ernment with respect to this issue. 
The situation between the two. countries did not 
change tor six months until February 1902, when .Colombia 
sent Jose Vicente ·conchas to replace ·Mar.t.!'nez. Mart!nez' s 
recall was based at le?st partly on his earlier public 
attitude on the concession, but he was also assigned to 
represent his country at the second Pan American Confer-
ence about to convene in Mexico City. Conchas· while not 
openly refuting the statements of·his predecessor made it 
clear that ~he policy of the Colombian Government had 
changed. C9nchas used a subtle approach to publicize the 
change in attitude by denying to the press that Colombia 
had been negotiating .with Great Britain on a canal con-
cession to go into effect after the French poncession· 
. 24 ' lapsed. By denying .that Gre~t Br~tain and Colombia were 
negotiatirg; .conchas brought up the .number of options still 
. . 
open to his country. .Co~ombia in the wfnter of 1901 was 
not negotiating with ~ny'European power on the canal issue, 
23 Ibid·.,. p. 111. 
24 New York Times, February 7, 1902, p. 4. 
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but they had not eliminated it ~s a possible option. 
Conchas further .let it be known that de.spite ·the Hay-
Paunce·fote Treaty that had just taken effect, Great Britain 
6ould still build a canal in Panama, the t~eaty only dealt 
. h .. h . ht . N' 25 w1t ·Br1t1s r1g s· 1n 1caragua. If the French failed 
to construct the canal in the time allotted to the Wyse 
concession., and the GOvernments of the United States and 
Colombia could no:t come to terms on the transfe.r of the. 
concession, then Colombia was free to deal with any country 
on ear~h. 26· The uncertainty of Colombia's intent, as well 
as. the other considerations prompted Senator Morgan's Com-
mi ttee to re.quest a forma~ report be made on the legal 
status of the .Wys·e concession with respect to its trans-
ferabilit~ to be forwarded to the full Senate upon comple-
. 27 t1on. 
The Congress that reconvened after the Christmas 
holiday of 1901 WqS aware that the French company had made 
an Qffer to sell the canal for the $40 million recommended 
price, .but there was little impact at the outset. The 
House o.f Representatives in parti~ular seemed unmoved by 
the announcement that came from·Paris.· .Congressman Hepburn 
25 .. 
·The Clayton~Bulwer Treaty.and·the Hay-Pauncefote 
.Treaty had both restricted British action in Nicaragua, 
bu~ neither treaty had any jurisdiction over Panama, there-
fore• Gr~at Britain: had unrestrained moveme·nt in the area. 
26 Parks, Colombia and the· United States,. p. 388. 
27 Se.n. Doc. 114, ·p. 131. 
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reintroduced the Nicaragua Canal Bill in 1902 in .exactly 
the same. form as it had been introduced in 1900·. The Rep-
burn Bil_l·· this tiine cleared through the proper committees 
and made it to the floor with no opposition. The propon-. 
ents of ·the bill. used the same arguments they had in 1900: 
the route was "American," it co_uld be easily negotiated, 
and it wa~ feasible. 28 Three new factors now also made 
·the route the most logical. The protocols signed, though 
not ratified, between the United States and Nicaragua, and· 
the United States and Costa Rica; the new Hay-Paunqefote 
Treaty had been ratified by the Senate, _and British rati-
fication was assured, thus era·sing any obstacle to Ameri-
can unilateral action; and the thir·d factor and probably 
the most convincing· new argument was the rec~mmendation 
of the Walker Commission. One of the major arguments in 
opposi~ion to the ~~pburn Bill in the·fifty-sixth Congress 
had been that the Walker Commission had no~ compl~ted the 
study of·all possible routes across the Isthmus. 29 The 
commission had compl~ted its study _by January 1902, and 
the Nicaragua route· had been recommended unanimo~sly. 
Despite the overwhelming support _for the Hepburn Bill 
in the House, s·ome debate did take place.. The proponents 
of the Panama route· expressed their views,_ though the 
2 8 c . 1 d' 35 . ongress~ona Recor , vol. , 57th Congress, 
1st Session, House, pp. 540-541. 
29 . . . . 
Congress~onal Record, vol. 33, pt. 6, 56th Con-
gress, l~t Sessi0n, Hous~, pp. 4926-4927. 
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30 debate was neither prolonged nor stren~ous. The bill 
passed the House o.~.Representatives early i:n January by a 
margin of 307 to 2. The two no votes were;not cast by 
proponents of the Panama route, but by two Congressmen who 
felt there existed n.o need fo·r any canal. The members of 
the House who favored the Panama route all voted for the 
Hepburn Bill, for often differing reasons. Some Panama 
proponents hoped that the bill would be amended in the 
Senate t~ fa~or Panama, while others felt that any canal 
was preferable ~o no canal. 
Senator Morgan was not as nonchalant about the of.fer 
from the New French Panama Car~:al Company' to sell their . 
concession. Years of frustration and false hopes had made 
the Alabaman wary of any change in the canal situation. 
Hoping 'to combat any changes in sentiment caused by the 
French announcement, ~organ.sought immediat~ action on the 
newly passed legislation. . In this push Morgan argued that 
all preliminary work had been done on the bill, and further 
hearings would be superfluous. · On the other hand, the 
proponel).ts of a Panama canal were as heart.ened by the Paris 
decision as the Nicaragua _proponents were disheart~ned. 
They therefore hoped for _Sen,atorial inaction unti.l the 
Walker Commission had an opportunity to re·act to the formal 
offer. The P~nama forces, a gr~up· that included many of 
the·most powerful Republican Senators, used stalling tactics 
30 Congressional Record,· vol.o 35, pt. 1, 57th Con-
gress, 1st Session, House, pp._Sl~-518. 
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in an-effort to. postpone action on the Hepburn Bill. 31 
The majority of the Senators in January 19q2 probaply 
favored the Nicaragua route, ?ut the power of the opposi-
tion was such that they could at least continue to delay 
t.he wishes of the .majority. Among the oppon~nts ·of speedy 
action for the b~ll were Senators Hanna, Lodge, and Aldrich, 
t~e last being the ·chairman of the Senate Rules Committee. 
With .th~s kind of opposi~ion•the bill ?ould not get. to the 
floor until it went into the Committee on an Interoceanic 
.Canal ·for another r.ound of hearings. 32 
While the Republ ic.an leadership in the . S'enate once 
again foiled the hopes. of· early passage for se·nator Morgan, 
President Roosevelt was ... taking steps that .would bring him 
activ~ly into the fray. Roosevelt had been in· close con-
tact with the Senate since taking office during the pre-
vious summer. Some of the S~nators, particularly Henry 
Cabot Lodge and George Hoar had been· fr.iends. of Roosevelt 
since .he was Governor of New York. ·Lodge beca~e one of 
the President's closest advisors at this time. Senator 
Hanna had also been involved in the President's career-,· 
though·for dif£eient reasons. Hanna, as McKinley~~ closest 
political advi~or, distrusted the ambitious young Governor 
of New York and had pressed for his. not being· placed on 
31 Miner, .Panama. Route, p. 12 4. 
32 11 Hearings Before a Sub-Committee of the Committee 
on Inter-Oceanic Canals,n Senate Report 783~ 57th Congress, 
1st Session, hereafter cited Sen. Rpt. _783, p. 44. · 
~9 
the second spot bf the ticket in 1900~ Hanna had referred 
to Roosevelt as "a goddamn cowboy"· and also used o'ther non-
fl . 3 3 . lt f h. t t d t atter1.ng terms.. . Rooseve . or J..S. par wan e no par 
of the vice-presidency when. the first feelers w~nt_ out~ 
One of the reasons that he had made. such ·vehement ·state-
ments about the Clayton-Bulwei ~reaty in '18~9 was to stop 
34' 
any .talk of his accepting the post. Roos·evelt only re-
lented after direct appeals from McKi.nley l:limself, and 
when faced with some unpleasant political realities. De-
s.pi te the earlier politic':l-1 animosity between Roosevelt 
and Hanna., the two men learned to work· together, ·and even 
to rely on each other. Since both Sena~or Lodge, and 
Senator Hanna hoped sqmething would come out of the French 
offer, it is no surpr~se that President Roosevelt asked 
Admiral Walker to reconvene his commission to discuss the 
offer. 35 
·President Roosevelt was the only· man with the auth- . 
. o:r;:lty to ~a.l1 the commission back together and Admiral 
Walker needed.no coaxing to go along as Walker felt the· 
. . 
French offer turned the tide in favor o.f J?anama._ .When the 
commission did .reconvene on January 15, 1902, Admi-ral 
Walker· informed. the me:mbership that President Roosevelt 
felt the French offer now made the Panama route the more 
·
33 M t h h f ; argare Leec , In t e Days o · McK1.nley, ·p. 537. 
34 New York Times, August 17, 1899, p. 4. 
35
. rtliner, Panama Route, p. 12 0 . 
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desirable. The majoirty of the members agreed with the 
President before Admir.a1 Walker's announcement.. Most. of 
90 
the evidence contained in the Walker Report seemed to rec-
h . h . 36 d . th . ommend t e Panama route as t e easl:-est, an now w1 
$60 million dropped from the .implied ask~ng.price, the last 
obstacle to· ·approva~ was removed. The conunission ·:was not· 
unanimous on the switch away from .. the Nicaragua ::t:ou:te. 
Professor Haupt, the perennial .champion of ~~e Nicaragua 
route·, at .f.irst r~fused to si.gn the supplemental .report, 
and vowed to submit a minority report~ To prevent discord 
w±.thin the commission, and at .the urgings ·of the President, 
who wanted a unanimous report, Ad~iral Walker interceded._ 
Haupt later reported that Admiral Walker had calle.d him 
out of the' room to reconsider, even telling him of the Pres-
ident-'s request. The combined pressure of Admiral Walker 
a11:d the President'~ narri~ accomplfsh~d the goal. Haupt 
agreed to ·sign the ·supp~emental report favoring the Panama 
. . 37 .. 
route. .The supplemental·commission report was· given to 
the Pre'sident on January. 18, 1902, and. R<;>osevelt sent the 
new findi~gs directly to Congress for immediate action. 
The month of January 1902 saw another_development that 
would ~elp def~at the Nicarag:ua .route--the alliance of · 
Willi.am Nelson Cro~weil, and Philippe Bunau-Varilla. Bunau-
Varilla exp~rien~ed his finest hour in January because of 
36 Walker Report, pp. 18-400. 
37 Sen • .Rp t . 7 ~ 3 , p . 1 7 . 
91 
the action of the stockholders' meeting. Never a man to 
· be overcome by modesty,. Bunau-Varilla took complete credit 
' . 
for the coup at the stockholders' meeting and the.subse-· 
. . 
quent·sale .offe~~ 38 Besides ~~tion.in Paris, the Frenchman 
. had also been busy in the United States. Throughout the 
short term of.President Roosevelt, Bunau-Varilla had at-
tempted ·direct· appeals to t.he chie.f executive to intervene 
in favor· of Panama. When Roosevelt did act by ca.ll.ing for 
·the.Walker Commission to reconvene, B.unau-Varilla took 
credit for .the conversion. Bunau-Varillais third reason 
for assuming credit for the reemergence of the Panama route 
dated.back to 1899~ In that year Bunau-Varilla made a 
speaking tou·r. to extoll the virtues of the Panama route. 
One of the cities on the itinerary was Cincinnati,.where 
he·.spoke to a group of prominent busines.smen. After the 
speech he was introduced ~6 Senator Hanna, whom he taiked 
with for some time about Panama. Bunau-Varilla ciaimed 
that his conversation with Hanna convinced the Senator of 
'. 39 . . 
the. superiority of the Panama route. .. Thus Bunau-Var1lla 
//' 
--took c·redi t for es.tablishing the price of the conce~sion,. 
interesti'ng ·the President, and converting the Senate's most 
. powe.~ful advocate to the side ·of Panama. 
While Bunau-Varilla ~as claiming victo.ry for hims·elf, 
based on ·the Walker Commission's decision to recommend 
'38 Bunau-Varilla, Panama, ·p. 212. 
39 Amering·er, "Panama Lobby," pp. 347-348. 
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Panama, William Nelson Cromwel~ was.· temporc;trily out of 'the 
fray. C~omwell .was not employed by the New Fr.ench· Panama 
Canal Company during the last six. months of .1901. Cromwell 
like·Bunau-varill~, wh~m he had never met, had insisted 
.. 
that Hut in's asking price .<?f $10.0 million was too high.· 
The New York attorney pressed the company board on this 
i~sue u~til July.l, 1901, when he was dismissed. Hutin 
·claimed that Cromwell 1 s job was to r_epres_ent the best· in-
terests of the company, and this inqluded getting the 
highe~t asking. price possible in case of a sale. Cromwell. 
by insisting that the company would have to lower their 
price failed in his. duties· accorqing -t·o Hutin. Cromwell's 
dismissal was. also based on the amount o.f money he had 
spent in his·work~ The company executives felt that he had 
l 
11 • • been extravagant ~n xelat~~nsh~p to what he had ·accom-
plish~d. 4° Cromw~ll cl~~med in his brief be~ore the French 
'. 
court to collect $800,000 in .fees, .that he had continued 
to work for the Panama route throughout the remainder.of 
th . 1901 d . h. d.. . 1 41 e year . esp~te ~s ~sm~ssa . In evaluating that 
claim. it should b.e remembered that Cromwell was. trying to· 
acquire the larges-t. lega~ fee ever rewarded by the French 
courts, and that his. so1e argument was based on h.is ·success 
,in getting the c-anal rout-e selected. Dwight c: Miner in 
discussing the ·mot·i ves of. Hanna, .Bunau..:.varilta ~ and 
4 O . Ibid·. , p . . 3 4 7 • 
41' 
"'Story ·of .Panama,·" p. 169. 
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While ·agreeing .ori the. necessity of an alliance, the 
two men also agreed on the ne~d for s:ecrecy. The two men 
never divulged the alliance. In fact bo.th men denie·d 
working together both at the time and for the remainder of 
t~eir lifetimes.· . Bunau-Varilla, who wrote three memoirs 
all dealing with this same issue, mentions.Cromwell only 
in passing, and then gives him credit for n~ither the 
selection of the Panama route by the Senate, nor in the 
s~bsequent revolution of 1903. 45 Cromwell, whose only 
written account of h~s role is contained in the legal 
brief he filed in the ·French courts in. 1907, never mentions 
. 46 Bunau-Varilla's name. Though the leaders in Congress who 
favored the Nicaragua route accused Cromwell and Bunau-
Varilla of conspiracy in trying. to deny.the United States· 
the best route, no hard evidence came to ·light until_·the 
early nineteen sixties with the discovery of some h~reto-
. . 47 
fore u~noticed·pape~s belonging to the Frenchman~ The 
consp~racy so vehemently denied by the Panama proponents 
existed. 
The·. Senate, as well as all .interested segments of 
45 Bunau-Variila, Panama: Creation, D~struction and 
Resurrection. The.Great Adventure of Panama. From·Panama 
to Verdun: ~1y. Fight For France. 
l 
46 Though no mention of the Frenchman is made 'di-
rectly, the telegram informing Cromwell that· he was re·-
hired by the company and signed. by Bunau-Varilla is 
included.in the "Story of Panama," p. 124. 
47 .f\rneringer,"P~nama Lobby,"· p. 346. 
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the public, r'ealized a major battle was .shaping up. over the 
Hepburn Bill that h.ad passed the House .of. R~presentative.s 
so overwhelmingly. Senator John Spooner of Wisconsin, a 
man better known for-his floor management of administration 
bills than fbr his interest in any danai route, 48 int~o-
·duced an amendment to the Hepburn Bill• · The Spooner Amend-
ment. called for the substitut-ion of the word Panama for 
.Nicaragua in the Hepburn.Bill, and al~o authorized Congress 
and the President .$40 million to purchase the Wyse Con-
. 49 
cession from the French .. 
While the several groups that favored.the Panama 
route.geared up for the Senate struggle, Senator Morgan 
, 
was planning the strategy of the Nicaragua forces. Through-
out the month of February 1902, Morgan worked on his two-
'pronged attacki showing the obvious benefits of the · 
Nicaragua route, and downgrading the Panama route as u.n-
_healthy, a~d scandal riddled. Mo~g~n's private c~rres-
pondences during this pe·riod show him in contact with a 
·variety of different experts and investigators. All the 
correspondence relates to Nicaragua and the canal. Morgan 
was in qontact with_ ·such diverse.· groups as .members o·f the 
sailing marines, and developm~nt engineers. The member· 
of the sailing marine·, maintained that the sailing ve.ssel 
·would remain important in world commerce, and that the 
48 Miner, Panama R9ute, p. 124. 
4~ Ibid . , .P • 12 3 • 
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Nicarag·ua canal had numerous advantages over a Panama route 
50 for this type of vessel. The deyeloping engineer wrot.e 
to Morgan ·informing him that Lake Nicaragua had ·the. greatest· 
·development potenti'al for a canal, that_ the Nicaragua route. 
had the·better water supply, and that the Lake's water 
'. 
~upply would ~e advantageous to -ship maintenance. Lake 
Nicaragua, and· the entire Nicaragua canal. would be fresh 
water, and· fresh water destroys barn.acles that buil_d up on 
the hulls of sea-going. ve.ssels, ·thus usin_g the Nicaragua 
:route would cut down the .nuffiPer of. times a ship would need 
. ' 51 
.its hull scraped. 
Morgan .not only-corresponded with experts in many 
fields, but he also·had ~t least one person engaged in data 
gathe.ring for his own use. The man,. identified by his 
signature as C. Colne, gathered what he coul~ in the way 
of engineering data f·avorable to the· Nicaragua route.~ 
while attempting ·at the same time to dig up evidence ad-
verse to. the Panama route. Colne qhowed .. particular inter-
est in the formation of the ~ew French Panama Canal 
Company, and the company by-laws as they pertained. to the 
·status and transferability of the concession. Colne's 
SO The Private Papers of Senator John Tyler Morgan 
in the National Archives, vol. 11, hereafter cited as 
Morgan Papers. · The· ·Morgan Papers as reproduced by the 
·National Archives contain no page references, but are in 
approximate chronological order. ·Letter s .· A. W. 
Benjamin to Morgan, Ma~ch 1, 1902. 
51
·Ibid., .letter E. P. Alexander to Morgan, March 4, 
1902. 
97 
information convinced Morgan that the United States could 
never receive clear title. to the Wyse Concession and would 
simply set herself up ·for extortion by the Colombian Gov-
.ernment, .which pad a right to any money involved in the 
transfer of the concession .. 52 Morgan was later to use 
this information in the debate on the Senate floor.· Morgan 
_through his private writings also accumulated numerous 
shipping tables that showed the benefits .of using a Nic-
aragua route~ Thes~ tables he often submitted to-the 
Senate in related repoJ?ts .• 53 
During the critical months of March and April 1902 
-Morgan worked feverishly to insu.re tha1;:. ·his long struggle 
' . 
would be successful. Besides his corres~ondences with 
those·who would aid Nicaragua, or shed disfavor on Panama 
he accumulated article·s that might be useful ~n his up-
. h 54 com1ng speec es. .Morgan was in contact·at this time 
with Luis _Co!ea, the charge d'affaires at the Legacion _de 
Nicaragua in Washington. Morgan had contacted Corea con-
cerning the rumor that Nicaragua intended to rais.e the 
price of·any concession granted to the United States. 
52 Ibid., letter C. Colne to Morgan, February 28, 
1902, also March 7, 1902. 
53 Ibid., le.tter Edwa.rd Nor~h to Mo"rgan, March 11, 
1902, also Senate Rpt. 1667, 57th Congress, 1st Session 
contains'such t~bles. 
54 Ib'd . . 
· 1 ., Morgan Papers, letter Morgan to Roosevelt 
concerning an article by Andrew Carne~ie recommending the 
Panama canal route. 
·-J" 
Corea, in his reply claimed that any stateme~t of this 
type was false adding: 
The government of ·Nicaragua has ever acted in. 
,good faith in this matter • Admir-al ·walker 
and hi.s co·lleagues re~0rnrnended four consecutive 
times the acceptance of the Nicaragua route, my 
Gover.nment never tried to take. advantage of.· 
these recornrnendations.55 
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Morgan further contacted fin~ncial experts for their opin-
ions on the fund~ng_ of a can~l. Would the canal funding 
require interest bearing bonds, or were there .other ways· 
f .d . . ?56 o O;Lng J.t. The Morgan papers for thi~ period show a. 
man obsessed with attaining a long'":"'sought _goal. They also 
show Mo~gan as a hard work~ng, real~stic and meticulous 
politician, 6becking all f~cets 6f the question ·to be 
p~epared for any contirigency. Morgan realized that thi~ 
would probably be the last chance for the canal he now 
considered his. route, and he wanted to take no chances. 
55 b. d 1 . ., ' . I J. ., etter L. Corea, .NJ.caraguan charged affaJ.res 
to Morgan, March 7, 1902. 
56 Ibid., letter Gri~fith Davis to Morgan~ received 
March 18, 1902 dated January 1,· 1902. 
CHAPTER V 
The.Hepburn Bill which passed the. House·of Representa-
tives by a margin of 307 to ·2 in Janl.:!-ary 1902 was· ~ent 
directly to .. the .Senate. Unfinished business on the ·floor 
of the upper chamber, and. the de.alings of Aldri~h .and 
others in opposition, delayed the introduction of the bill 
throughout January and ·February.. Finally i,n March .19 0.2 
Senator John Tyler Morgan introduced the Hepburn Bill to 
the whole Senate. Though Morgan had.worked very har.d both 
in. and out of the Senate to ~nsure the passage of the bill, 
he realized' that his advantage was slipping in favor o·f' the 
Panama proponents. As a last ditch effort to pass the bill 
nefore the opposition's already growing strength got. any 
greater, Morgan asked for immediate consideration of the 
bill and ~uspensio'~ of.the rt:tles. 1 The request was denied 
. . 
and the bill was sent to the Committee on an Interoceanic 
Cahal for consideration. 
. . 
As Morgan saw h~s support slowly fading, the opposi-
tion strength grew around him. Senator Lodge of Massa-
c~usetts and Senator Hanna both wielded their considerable 
power to line up votes· for the Panama route. The supple-
mental repa.rt to the Walker Commission that favo·red. 
Panaro~ aided its Senate supporter~. The reasoning of the 
new report .impressed not only. uncommi tt~d Senators.,· but 
1 
.Congress·iona:l Record·, val .. 35, 57th Congress, 1st 
S~ssion, S~nate, pp. 754-755. 
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even swayed some of the here-t·o-for.e diehard proponents of 
the Nicaragua route. The Senate confrontation appeared 
long and bitter .as the bill went through committee and a 
se.cond reading and th~ Senate leaders·hip ·.established. a 
debate 'schedule. 2 
The debate between the.proponents of the. Panama and 
the Nicaragua ~cutes .started out with the leading advo-
cates. Senator Mo'r.gan ·gave the opening speech of the de-
bate in April 1902, and although he pla~ned to speak more 
.than once du~ing the debate, he pulle~ out all stops on 
·this first excursion. · The Nicaragua route was feasible; 
the Walker Commission reports from both 1899 and 1901 de-
clared there ~ere no ~ngineeri~g probl~ms to be faced in 
the construction of a Niearagua canal that had ndf been · 
faced ~nd conquered·elsewhere in the past. All the equip-
ment necessary for the prqject was readily available. 3 
Morgan did not rely solely on·the Walker Commissions, he 
also quoted from the Menocal S·Urvey·,· the. Ludlow Cobmission 
of 1895, and ~ven submitted a s·urvey taken during. the 
'4 
·colonial period. 
Senator Morgan's speech drew upon the numerous sources 
he. aceumulated over the years,·while drawing especially on 
the report of Admiral Walk~r's two commissions. In Morgan's 
2 Ibid • , p . 7 5 5 . 
3 Walker Report, p. 147. 
. 4 
Congressional Record, vol. 35,_ 57th-Congress, 1st 
Session, Senate, p. 950. 
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eye·s the s·upplement: to the second Walker Report was insig-
nificant compared to all 'the positive things said about 
the Nicaragua route.· The reports uniformly agreed ~hat the 
climate .tn Nicaragua would be ideal for building a canal, 
not all the ma.terial was as favorabfe in. discussing Panama. 
Morgan· poi~ted out that several surveys of the. te.rrain had 
shown th~ climate along the .Nicaragua route as warm and 
humid, but not infest·ed with the numerous disease-carrying 
insects that existed in. Panama. One report showe.d that 
· whereas the Europeans at:ld Ameri.cans who worked in Panama· 
had a hig~ rate of'infection ·from yellow fever and similar 
tropical disease~, the fe~white men that had worked in 
Nicaragua had been mqre productive and healthier. 5 In this 
same vein Morgan-accumulated evidence that the natives of 
the region in Nicaragua .where the projected canal wa~ to be 
built could and did work hard and were not detrimentally 
affected by the climate~ 6 
According to Senator Morgan, the political climate in 
Nicaragua favored a United States canal and the government 
had .the sole authority of working out a concession. There 
would be no need for third party interference. The Panama 
route on the other hand belonged to a French company under 
5 
"Material on the Nicaragua Canal," Senate Document 
157, 56th Cong~ess, .2nd Sess·ion, p. 361. 
6
·. "Document.s Relating to Inter-Oce·anic Canal," Senate 
Document 377, 57th Congress, l'st Session, p. 241. ··Here-
after cited Sen. Doc. 377. 
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a Colombian government. grant. Th:i,.s s.ituation was further 
complicated by. the unstable political climate in. Panama 
where the frequent attempts to se-cede from· Colombia had 
not abated. The uns.table political situation avoided ch.aos 
only because of national military· iritervention,. and occa-
s:i,.brial intervention of .the Unite.d States military. based .on 
. . d . 46 7 the treaty s~gne ~n 18 .• The political situation in 
N.ic.aragua by comparison was stable. The border disputes 
with Costa Rica which had.~lared up from time to time had 
subsided due partially to the. projected canal. 
Cost.a Rica, which would have some territory in a pro-
jected.canal zo'ne, and Nicaragua signed a preliminary·agree-
ment with the United States in December l900. The agreements 
.negotiated by Secretary of State Hay established protocol 
for a~:y· furt~er ag:reements between the countries with res.-
pect to a canal. Senator Morgan claimed tha.t .these treaties, 
which were never submitted for ratifica-tion du~ to the un-
certainties of·the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, could now be 
.ratified by all·the concerned countries. This would give 
the United States Government the ·basis it needed to handle 
al1 legal .questions concerning a_concession. 8 Morgan· con-
tras.te.d this simple step with the ~ntangled legal barriers 
in Panama. 
7 Sen. no·c. · 2 31, p. 18 3. 
8 Congressional Record, vol. 35, 57th Congress, 1st 
Session, Senate, p. 4288. 
103 
Morgan called· upon the patrio~ism of the .Sen.ators in 
considering the two routes. The Nicaragua route as Margan 
painted it, both in his speech and in .numerO':J.S doc:uments 
he ordered printed over the year~, was the American route. 
Over the last three decades such prominent Americans as 
Ulysses S. Grant. and Ruth~rford .B·. Hayes had been directly 
interested {n a Nicaragua qanal.. All the early surveys and 
commissions sent out to investigate ·a route had been sent 
N. 9 to ~caragua. The Panama route on the other hand, was tpe 
French or .foreign route. Europeans had planned it, financed 
·it, and involved it in scandals, while all action i~ Nic-
aragua had been carried on in the. high~st tradition of 
American business. 
Senator ·Hanna made .the initial speech opposing Morgan's 
position. .After .a· poli ti~al career as a behind-:--the-scenes 
kingmaker in.Ohio, he had received an interim Senatorial 
app~intment·in 1897. Hanna had never practiced 'or mastered 
the art of oratory, bu~ despite these drawbacks, he out-
lined.adequat~ly what he considered the major issues of 
the controversy. K~owing that several surveys had shown. 
that. a ·canal thr9ugh.Nicaragua. was feasible, Hanna recog-
. 
nize.~ t~e efficiency ·of the commissions an~ would no.t argue 
with the conclusions, but took the stance that a Panama 
site was more practica·l .. _ Hanna felt· that ·since the venture 
to build a canal through the Central American isthmus was 
9 Walker Report, p. 9 •. 
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one of the largest business investments·in history it 
sho.uld be approached in a very business-like manner. No 
work had been done in Nicaragua, no equipment was there, 
and the~e were no workers in the area who were trained for 
the kind· of work that would be done. ·The. situation in 
Panama was different •. ~s the Walker Commission had pointed 
out, majo~ progress had been. made in the Panama project. 
Even subtracting all the wo~k that.would have to be. done 
over because the jungle ·had reclaimed t~e right of ~ay, or 
because the climate had destroyed the equipme.nt '· $40 mill:lon 
worth of ·work had be.en · do_ne·. The equipment neees·sary· to 
start.the remainLng.w~rk in Panama was on the scene. A 
trans-isthmian railroad-that· followed the route specified 
for the canal··was already cor1:structed. At least some o.f 
I 
the eng iD:eer_s and laborers who would take part· in the pro- . 
ject were threr,· and housing, stprage, and health facil- . 
. ities were· in place: ·For these reasons amd~q others,· the 
wa·lker ·commission. had felt that the. Panama project could 
be comp.leted faste~· ti:-an t_he ~icaragua project, and time 
. ·: . 10 
on a·project like this-was.money •. Hanna pointed out .that 
·One d~ the major ·cost .difference.s-. compute.d between the 
Nicarag~a project and the Panama project was based on the 
money being spent in interest. Since the latter would. be 
done first, br .faster, less money would· be lost in interest 
10· Congressio_nal· RE?.cord, vol. 35, 57th Congress, 1st 
Session, Senate, p. 4304 •. 
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. . . 11' . before revenues started com1ng 1n. · 
Hanna was to make another .speech on the issue n~ar 
the end 6f the debate, a speech thaf ·is generalli cons~dered 
the finest speech of his career;· but Morgan and Hanna were 
not the only Senators to take an active role in the debate. 
Both the pro-Panama forces and the pro-Nicaragua forces 
took an active role in the question. Senator John Mitchell, 
a Republic~n from Oregon, ·pla:yed a key :r:ole in the centro-
versy as an advocate for·Nicaragua. Mitche~l, ·who was the 
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Coastal Defenses, was . 
nearing. the end of· a che'ckered ·career that dated back over 
twenty-five years in .the Senate.· An attorney· by profes;... 
sion, he .seemed astonishingly well versed on m~ny ·of the 
major ·engineering issues·even with the most detailed in-
formation from the second Walker Commission report. Be-
sides stressing what .Mitch~ll felt w.ere .the obvious 
engineering advantages to the Nic-aragua·r<;>ute, the Oregon 
Senator also stressed.the political cli~ate in Nicaragua. 
~s ha.d been.pointed.out·before, both in the Senate, and in 
the numerous :reports, N:lcaragua was a. stclble· country with 
little likelihood of political turmoilj while the political 
dissension at Panama was notorious. Large amounts of cap-
i tal should be invest.ed where the political climate was- . 
.. s·table, not in a ·possible hotbed of se.paratist feeling. 
·11· Ibid., p. 4305. 
12 ~his was the critical feature in Mitchell's eye. 
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Senator Ha'rris, a Republican from Kansas· who was a 
trained· el}.gineer, .strongly advocated the Nicaragua· route 
and,. unlike most·members of Congres~,.read the Walker Com-
miss~on Report with a professional expertise. Like al·l 
the major speake~$ on the debate, he extensively quoted the 
report's evidence favoring Nicarague over Panama. Though 
h:i,s arguine'nts did .not prev.ail, it is· int~.:r;-esting to note 
that the only engineer who ·~ook part ~n the Senate debate 
. . ' 13 
did favor the Nicaragua route. 
Much of the debate centered.on engineering questions, 
.p.articularly as they applied to Panama. · One of the chief 
areas of contention was the Bohio Dam. The dam.would be 
ne~essary in buildi~g a lock _canal through ·Panama, and was 
considered the most difficult single engineering feature 
on the route. One· of the· arguments put f~rwaFd by the. 
partisans ot the Nicaragua route was the imposs~bility of 
building the dam. The proponen~s of the Panama route de~ 
·fended the dam by quo'ting the Walker·· Commi'ssion .. The com-
mission had :found the dam to l:;>e feasible with the equipment 
and knowledge then a~ailable~ 14 
The Walker Commiss.ion Report discussed the water 
tables of both countries. Nicaragua~ due to the vastness 
12 Ibid., 6329. p. 
13 Ibid., 6500·-6.505. pp. 
14 Walker Repo;rt,· · 78. p. 
· ... --:-.:.. 
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of the lake that the canal wo~ld travel through would have 
a~equate water at_all times. It was pointed out in several 
documents that. from the time th~t ~uropeans had started 
keeping records of.the area there_had never been a serious 
. . 15 
water· shortag~; In di~cussing the Panama route the 
Walker Commission maintained that whereas· certain times 
·of the year provided. more water for the canal than others, 
at no time was there serious dang~r of the route having 
• > ' • 
inadequate supplies. The Nicaragua ,proponents .had shown 
in evidence. submitted before the Committe'e on. an Inter-
oceanic Canal that the dang.er o·f· drought was very real . 
. At this point, both sides used any argument they could to 
discredit the opposition,. yet constant reference to the 
report.o:f; the Walker Commiss'io"n seemed to indicate that it 
had been carefully read by a great many Senators • 
. The last. major .e'ngii?-e.erin.g question to concern the 
Senators dealt wi~h the harbor facilities in Nicaragua. 
Panama had d,eep water harbors at both: ends of the is.thmus, 
that had·been operating.as major ports for decades. The 
Panama Railroad, and the earlie~ Panama road across the 
mou~tains.had made this. area a major shipping lane for well 
over a century. ·The eastern te~minus, and the western 
terminus of.the proposed Nicaragua route had no ports, in 
fact neither place had a navigable harpor in 1902. The 
propo~ents of the Panama route pointed out that while the 
15 Ibid .. , .P. 81 . 
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Walker Commission Report agreeq that a .feasible harbor 
would be possible at ·both. locations, the report had favored 
the al~eady existing ports in Panama, as both already es-
tablished; and better than any that could be built in Nic-
16 
ara9u.a. 
The proponents of the~Nic~ragua route argtied the case 
of the sailing merchant m.arine. Morgan, as mentioned· 
above, had been in contact with.members of this group of 
seamen, and they had' favored the Nicaragua canal for their 
~essels •. The Nicaragua c~nal would not only allow for 
easier transport for these vessels, but the onshore winds 
favored the Nicaragua route .. Ship~ that·were dependent on 
the trade·winds had been ·.stuck. fo~ some d~ys awaiting 
fa~orable winds in both ports on the coast of Panama .. The · 
prevailing wind~ near th~ Nicaragua·canal were more reli-
able. The proponent.~ of the Panama route saw this argu-
~ent as ·trivial, the days of the sailing .ship were numbered, 
and should not be cqns.idered seriously when discussing the 
. 17 proJect. 
. . 
The .debate continued t.hroughout .. the months of April 
and May 1902, w.ith each side attacking and defending· their 
relative positions. · The ~dvocates of the Nicaragua route: 
det~iled· the health hazards that e·xisted in: Panama. There· 
existed solid evidenoe that the .isthmus at Panama had a 
16. 
Ibid. , p • 13 9 • 
l? Congressional Record, vol. 35, 57th Congress, 1st 
Session, Senate, p. 6662. 
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real yellow fever problem. As far back as the first French 
efforts on the isthmus, the.disease had taken its toll in 
lives and. lost man hour.s, seriously hampering construction. 
The pay scale was high in Panama, due a great deal to the 
health hazards faced by any Europeans, o~ North Americans 
. 18 
who trie.d to work· there.· . Sen~to·r Morgan, as part of ·the 
campaig.n he waged·· to distribute evidence on the question, 
. submitted portions of a hook, Five Years in Panama, that 
dealt with the problem. ~~e book, written by a physician, 
t<:>ok the pessimistic view that European settlement in 
. . 
Panama would be futile, unless ~ cure for the disease 
19 
could be found. The proponents of the Panama canal could' 
not refute either the. argument, or the evic;ience on the 
stat.e ·of disease, so they gener.ally ignored the issue when 
· it· was raiseQ,. 
·rndir.ectly the Panama .advocates countered the yellow . 
fever arguments. with a safety· argument aimed at the Nic~ 
aragua advocates. Nicaragua was .said to be unsafe as a 
pr?jec~ site due -:to the dangers of. eart.hquakes and vol-
canic action. This argument had been put f~rward.and de-
bated several times in the past, in ·committee~, ·in the 
House· of Representatives,· and even in periodicals, ·in-
·eluding N·ational Geographic~ nonetheless it was dragged 
is· 
"Five Years in Panama," Sen.ate Document 401, 5·7th 
Congress, 1st Session, .p. ·368. 
19 b.d· 37 
. .!__2:_. , p. 1. 
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out for the· pu~pose_of debate again in 1902. The advocates 
of a Nic:aragua canal, wh.ile not denying that there was some 
·danger of volcanic action and ~a.r-t::hquakes in :Nicaragua, 
conten~ed that a similar danger existed in Panama. Another. 
one of the numerous· piece~_submitted to the Senate through 
the Committee on an Interoceanic Canp.l dealt with a severe 
-earthquake that had partially destroyed Colon, one of the 
. 20 
port cities on the Pa.nama route. Throughout ·the -debate 
both .sides claimed to be on the side of the angels by con-
sistently referring to the.Walke~ Co~ission Report, yet 
on this issue both s~des ignored the report'·s conclusion; 
the danger of. earthquake i. and .volcanic activity existed, 
but was too slight· to.be c:onsidered significant at either. 
location.. The argument when first introduced ·into the de-
bate seemed to be but a minor piece in the whole argument-, 
though later events were to make this . an issue of cons.ider-
·able significance. 
The Senate debate on the Spooner Amendment to the 
Hepburn Bill was not carried on in a vacuum. ·Besides the 
activities of William Nelson· Cromwell_, and his ally Philippe 
Bunau-Varilla, the_ press showed a marked interest in· the 
debate's progress, an·d. none more so than the Ne.w York 
Times. · Since the United States had become seriously in-
terested in building a· transisthmian canal, the . Ti.mes ·had 
shown a pronounced favortism toward the N~caragua route. 
20 Sen. Dqc. 377, p. 258. 
---. 
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The reports of the various commissions had been noted, as. 
had the scandals of tpe first French· co~pany, and th~ 
economic woes of the second company. Whe·n the second 
Walker ·commissio!l release.d. their· fina-l report ~n· Nov~mber 
· 1901, the paper app'lauded their ~ffort, and wholeh~artedly 
d d h. . 1 .. 21 en orse t e~r cone us~on. The.editors were satisfied 
that the best interest of.the United States had been 
served, and that any .attemp~s by the·railroad lobby to stop 
a canal had been thwarted. As the ·s~tuation changed, vis-
a-vis· the French.company's attitude toward establi~hing a 
selling price, the. n.ewspaper' ~ edi ~orial_ opinion changed. 
The paper duly reported.the supplementary report of the 
Walker Commission, but gone was the e~t:husiasm that· had 
. met previous announcements; and in its stead was a note of 
. . .. 22 
caut~on. The editors did not criticize the new report, 
on the contrary, they- recognized me~·it in the new proposal, 
and ~ourage in the forthright manner in which the change 
had b.een handled. 
As the debate prog·ressed in the Senate dur_it;lg the 
spring· of 190.2 the New York. Times slowly returned to its 
original stance in favor of a Nicaraguan·canal. The paper 
agreed with.the Walker Commission's cost analysis of the 
two routes_, but pointed out that perhaps there were other 
factors than just money to be considered. If the United 
'21 New Yo.rk Times,· ·November :6 ·, 1901, p. 6. 
22 Ibi.d., June 21, ·1902. Also June 8, 1902, p. 6 
and May 2~902, p. 6. 
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States c.ould purchase the Panama concession for $40 million 
then. the Nicaragua canal wou1d cos_t five million· do~lars.' 
more tP,?n ·Panama, but the paper wa·rned that perhaps i ~ was· 
a· five mil.lion dollar mist-ake. In applauding the decision 
of November ],.901, the paper had rej-oiced at the fina,l de-
mise of·those who would try to foil an American canal, in 
the spring of 1902 the w~rnings se~med to reappear. 23 When 
. . 
the Tifues first reported the introd~ct~on ~f the Spooner 
Amendment th~ paper predicted but _never endorsed_ the _pas-
. . 
sage Qf the amendment.· Throughout the· Sena~e debate, while· 
tr.ying to appear objective, .and non-~artisan, the paper 
favored the Nicaragua route~ 
During the critical months from February to June 1902, 
the secret alliance of Cromwell and Bunau-Varilla worked 
overtime. Both men, Cromwe~l the realist and Bunau-Varilla 
·the_optimist, realiz~d that·a ·senate vote for the Nicaragua 
route at that time· would ~nd t:tleir hopes for a Panama route. 
permanently,· while· a vote· for Panama would simply_ mean .they 
.had won another round. ~romwell worked feverishly with 
Senator Hanna and the .other Republican leaders to stress 
the practica~ity .of. the route. While pre~aring the Sen~-
tors for the· debate·,· Cromwell w~s constantly reassuring 
them of the rightness of their action~ He issued ·continued 
assurances that· the transferability of the concession was 
' no problem. Just how involved Cromwell was behind the 
23 Ibid·.,. June 8, 1902, p. 6.-
__ ---: 
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scenes i~-not knowrl. The attorney~s sole aim was to sell 
the company, ~hus -earning a sizable commission. In .. ac-
complis_hing ·this feat he not_ only was willing to .stay ou:t 
of the public view, he felt that it was imperative. His· 
.reputation as a wheeler-dealer would be of no aid to the 
oro-Panama· forces if it became known that he was helping 
... . 
them. It.was not until over five.years later, in 1907, 
that Cromwell admitt·ed any role in the proceed~ngs, and he 
only dfd so at that time to j·ustify the enormous. fee he 
asked the French court to award him. Also by 1907 the 
United States was in the middle of construction of.the 
canal, ·and his ro~e wou1d have no effect on the project. 
In the Cromwell brie.f, which is still the only documen_t 
available to study the rol.e he claime.d to have· played, he. 
went so .far as to claim a~thorship for Ha·nna' s s_peeches of 
J.une 5 and 6. 24 This claim, like many. of the claims of 
his ally Bunau-Varilla, is ·.undoubtedly inflated.· Hanna 
did work with Cromwell ·and was· influenced_ by arguments, 
but it seems· unlikely .that a man as· knowledgeable of the 
_supject as Hanna was, and .as ·shrewd a politician, would 
either need or allow_ a lobbyis·t to write the -most impor-
tant speech of his ca-reer. Even today, almost sixty years 
after his death, it is di~ficult for the historian fully 
·to evaluate ·cromwell··' s ·role. and motives becaus·e his private 
papers have never been .opened to public scrutiny· .• 
24 ~Story of Panama," p. 180. 
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While CromV!ell labored cov:ertl.Y, Bunau-Varilla took 
the direct public ·approach he had used f.or years. The 
Frenchman ran a perpetual lecture serie~ for anyone who 
would listen,·· and who m~ght have some power to alter the 
outcome. For several ye~rs Bunau-Varilla had. made ·a habit 
of inviting men ·of infl uenc.e to .his h9me for dinner, and 
then talking for hocirs about the benefits .bf.the Panama 
25 
canal. His activities in the spring of 190·2 rea·ched a 
fever pitch, not only did he continue to ent~rtain at home, 
and carry on his lecture s~ries, but he also-wrote l~tters 
to· p~ople of influence, from President Roosevelt on down. 
Bunau-Varilla not on:Ly extol1ed the v~rtues of the Panama 
route, but turned his talents as a promo·te.r towards dis-
crediting the Ni·caragua route.. .Bunau-Varilla paid partic-
ular attention to the argument that the Nicarag~an route 
wa·s in constant dang.er from natural disaster. Nature came 
to the aid of Philippe .B.unau-Varilla in May of 1902 in the 
form of a disaster in the.Caribb~an Sea. 
Mt. Pelee, on.the· island of Martinique, erupted sud-
denly and· violE?ntly·, pouring tons of lava· onto· the town of 
·saint-Pierre. The erupt.ion ·was s·o sudden and devastating 
that over tpirty thousand people perished, one qf the 
worst disasters in the modern era. T~e ·significance o.f 
the event, both as ·to ·timing and geography was not lost on 
·Bunau-Varilla. Martinique was si_tuated, on about the same 
25 Bunau-Varilla, Panama, p. 181. 
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latitude as·the proposed Nicaragua canal. Nicaragua, as 
mentioned above,. had. a·_ number. of vo~canic peaks in various 
states qf activity, in.fact, Nicaragua's most famou~ land-
.mark was Mt. Momotombo, a picture-per.fect cinder cone, . 
tha·t was even gl<;>r~fied on. t:.he country 1 s postag~ stamps. 
Bunau-Varilla took this opportunity to insure victory for 
the Panama route. By his own·. account·, Bunau-Varilla pur-
chased one hundred Nicaraguan sta'mps wit'h the picture of 
Mt. Momoto~o. He then sent one stamp, along with an 
account of the Mt. Pel~e disaster ·to every Senator. The 
.remaining stamps -he sent to other persons directly in-
volved in the controversy, including President Roosevelt, 
and Secretary of· ·state ·John Hay. It is impossible to mea-
·sure the impact of this dee~, though Bunau-Varilla main-
tains that this insured the vic~ory of the Panama route 
26 in the upcoming d.~bate ·. . 
Even if· .Philippe Bunau-:-Varilla ·was a more credible 
.witness to the events of the period, his assertion th~t 
the stamps turned the tide would·be.questionable, when 
·added to the other evidence it assumes the ·proportions· .of 
being .absurd. The New York· Times, as previously men-
tioned, .had predicted victory for-~he Spooner ·Amendment, 
at the time· it was introduqed. The reasons the paper gave 
were many,·but the argument·of natural· disaster was not 
one of them. It is also true, and·was known at the time 
26. Ibid.,· .p .. 229. 
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.that Mt. Pel~e and ·Mt. Momotombo were not in the same vo.l-
~anic .. range.· Mt. Morp.otombo wa·s part of the volcanic 
mountain range that stret~hes .. with few interruptions from 
Alask;a to Tierre de.l Fuego, Mt~ Pelee was part· of .a vol-
canic chain that stretchei primarily'in an e~st-west di-
rection·, at that latitude· in many parts of the globe. In 
other words, 'the eruption of Mt. Pe lee di,d not increase in 
any way the danger of an ~ruption of Mt. Momotombo, ~r 
any other volcano o~ .the American continent. It was also 
common knowledge that.Mt. Momotombo was not situated any-
where near. the prqposed canal route·. The mount~in vyas 
located on the north end of Lake Man~gua, in northern Nic-
aragua, the proposed canal route ran through the southern 
portion of Lake Nica~agria,· on the-southern border of the 
country.. Even a total e·ruptipn .of Mt. · Mom9tombo would have 
nq effect on the canal, whether it was under cons·truction, 
or in· operation. These factors, along with the often 
quoted Wal~er Co~isst.on findings that. the danger of natural 
disaster was ·minimal, .deflated the Frenchman's inflated 
claim. Still, the disaster at Martinique made the world 
and the United States Senate volcano conscious at a criti-
cal period .. 
As the debate moved· into ·the final month, Senator 
Morgan realized he was losing ground. On June 5, 1902, 
Hanna gave his much-heralded. speech in defense of the Panama 
·canal.- The. speech, a.l th.ough it introduced no new arguments, 
was not on~y the greatest of tbe Ohio Senator's career, but· 
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the most important speech of the entire debate.. The speeeh 
was presente~ lik~ ~business report ~o a group of paten-· 
tial stockholders,· complete with graphs and charts. Hanna 
did not try to sway the Senate with his rhetoric because 
he knew that if rhetor~c was going to'deci~e the issue 
he could nbt possibly comp~t~ wi~h the oratorical skills 
of Morgan; Hanna used cold facts and figures. He referred 
to the Walker Commission as a source of his evidence·, both 
financial and scientific.· The Panama project was parti:-
ally done, therefore it wo~ld be less expensive. The 
Panama project would· be done soone·r, thus· it would start 
. . 
paying off soo~er than t~e Nicar~gua route. The Panama 
route was only .forty-nine miles from pbrt to port, while 
the Nicaragua route was over one hundred and eighty-three 
miles wide,· therefore the trip would take le.ss t;i..me, and 
more ships could pass through faster, provid{ng more .reve-
nue for_the country that built it. The shorter canal would 
also be easier and cheaper to maintain, and finally it 
would be sat"er. Hanna reminded the Senators that this was 
th·e largest business investment ever made by the United 
States in peace tim~, and. therefore great .caution must be 
exercised to insure· l.t. Hanna then outlined a ·history of 
natural disaste~s in the area around Nicaragua th~t would 
. . . 27' 
make a.ny ~nyestor wary. The poli.tical lessons of Mt. 
""· Pelee were not lost on Hanna,· and he would stick to the 
27 
.Congressional .Record, vol. 35 ,· 57th Cong.ress, 1st 
Session, p. 6853. 
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advantage it had granted him. Whether Hanna was indeed 
influenced by Cromwell, ·as the latter was. ·lat~r to main-
tain, it is impossible to say. The Senator obviously 
received the stamp and the articles from Bunau-Varilla, 
.though it is rather doubtful that they·added anything to 
Hanna's pre-arranged battle plan.· Hanna left no record of 
. . . 
how he f.ormulated the ideas for his speech,· nor dfd he ever " 
say who helped him with it,·so.~t is impossible to know 
for sure what role any ou~side characters played. It is 
certain·though that the affect of the speech was both im-
mediate and profound. The New York Times granted more 
coverage to this speech than any other of the entire d~­
bate.28 
The proponents of the Panama route had one other g+eat 
speech in the debates of June 1902, }?y·senator A. B. Kit-
teridge, a ·South Dakota Repub.l·ican, who .spoke on the issue 
a few days after Senator Hanna. The speech·, w?ich .was the 
maiden one for .the· Senator, paid.only ~dant attention t6 
the sc{entific.and finanqial questions, because Kitteridge 
was more intere~ted in the legal questions. Senator Kit-
teiidge discussed the pr6t6cols that had been signed.by 
Secretary Hay. ~~d the ministers of Nicaragua and Costa.Rica 
in December 1900. ,Senator Morgan. argued that these unrati-
fied prot~cpls wer~ t~e.basis fo~ future dealings on an 
interoceanic canal through Nicaragua .. Kitteridge contended 
28 New York Times, June ·6, 1902·, p. 1. 
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they meant nothing. The two protocols had never been intro-
duced into the Senate for ratification, and unt'il .. they had 
been pr~sen.ted, and ratified they had no standing in inter.-
national law.' . In the meantime., they. coul~ be completely 
. . 29 ~gnored. 
· Kitteridge next discussed ·the French canal concession 
granted by the Colo~ian Government. Drawing from a number 
of legal sources, includin·g the Walker Commission,. and a 
firm law background, Kitteridge argued that the transfer 
of the Wyse Concession was legal and could be ~ccomplished • 
with minimal.effort. 30 The United States Senate was com-
, 
prised of many l.awyers, and th.e legal questions on the con-:-
cession had been discussed over and over, but the Kitteridge 
speech stood out as the most important one on the topic 
during the prolonged debate. 
Th·e debate ·moved into the .second week of June, and 
an attempt was made to stave off the increasing bitterness 
in the S~nate by refus~ng to make a· decision on· which ·route 
to. choose for the canal. George Frisbee Hoar, the senior 
Senator from Ma.s$a~husetts, introduced an amendment during. 
the final days.of the debate that would put the selection 
in the hands of.the President. The Hoar Amendment auth-
orized Congress to appropriate the money necessary to build 
fi can~l throu~h Q~Yl.tra.llmerica I. b~t: instructed 'the President 
29 
co·ngressional Record, vol. 35, 57th· Congress, lst 
Session, p. 6853~ 
30 Ibid . ·, p.. 6 8 5 5 . 
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to negotiate with whomever necessary to determine a route. 
. . 
Hoar observed that if :the Spooner Amendment was adopted, 
th~ President would have the ~inal say over which route was 
· se~ected anyway·, and. that the adoption of his amendment 
. h d . h 1 b' 31 coqld accompl~sh .t e· same. en w~t ess ~tterness. Th~ 
Hoar Amendment was defeated handily, to no one's great 
' ; 
surprise, but it is_significant ~hat George F .. Hoar, one 
of the oldest and most r~specte.d Republican Senators, should 
introduce such an -amendment. H.oar was representative of 
a number of .Senators mo:t;'e concerned-with getting a canal 
.built, th~n with any one route. 
Thr~ughout the last.month of the debate Senators 
Mitchell, Morgan, and-Harri¢, as well as some of their 
·allies·had desperagely trie~ to turh back th~ tide that was 
pushing for the Panama· route. On the 16th and· 17th o'f May 
Senator Morgan warned the Senat~ that a cons'piracy existed 
that would deprive the United_ S~ates of a feasible canal 
route. The chieJ villain of thE;! conspiracy in Morgan's 
speech, -was William Nelson· Cromwell. Cromwell, the .Power 
behind the Panama. 11 lobby,".was trying to sell the United 
States .a.canai route that probably could not be completed 
32 ' . 
as planned. . Though Morgan's allegation ·that a ".lobby" 
existed was· denied at the time., the .Alabama Senator came 
very close to the_t~uth, a tr~th that would not €orne to 
31 Ibid .. I p . 6 8 6 0 • 
32 Ibid., pp. 6653-66~6. 
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1ight for many Y.ears.. While Senator Morgan was ·cautioning 
the Senate about the conspiracy, Senator Harris was trying 
to play down the da?.ger o'f !latural disaster. The Walker 
Commission clea.rly showed that. earthquake, and volcanic_ 
danger was mini~al, despite the evidence presented by Sen-
ator Hanna. The .eruption of M;t. Pel~e had. deprived the 
advocates of the Nicaragu·a ro~te of a positive _attack 
against earthquake. danger in Panama, vo.lcanoes be·came the 
chief concern, and they.existed in Nicar~gua. Defensive 
action was necessary.· The Nicaragua advocates .also re-
~inded the Senators th~t the transfe~ of t~e concession was 
questionable, ~nd even the Colombian Government was now 
making no direct statements on their attitude on.the issue. 
While th~ ·Spooner :Amendment woul.d mean the beginning of a 
lo!lg, possibly fruitless,. negotiation with Colomb .. ia, ·the 
·adQption of the Nicaragua route would mean the ·simple rati-
fication of pre~signed protocols, and then negotiations 
with two countries ·eager to· have a canal;.. 
·. The debate wqund up _on the eighteenth of June, and 
the vote on the S~ooner Amend~ent to the Hepburn Bill took 
place on the nineteenth. As expected, the amendment sub-
stituting the· WC?rd "Pa:nama" for·"~icar~gua" was adopted. 
The vote on the amen~ent was· 42 to 34. The reconstituted 
b . 11 d . h . 33 . ~ passe ln t e Senate 61 to 7, and. the two houses of 
Congress had now reached a stal.emate. The· House·· of 
33 Ib i ~ . , .P • 7 0 7 4 • 
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Representatives had selected the Nicaragua route by the 
overwhelming majority of 306 to 2, and the Senat~ had 
selected the Panama route by the likewise huge m~jo.rity of 
61 to 7. The two bills now· went to a joint committee ·for 
a compfomi s·e. 
The Senate sent to the.j6int committee Senators John 
Tyle~ Mqrgan, Marcus Alonzo Hanna,: and A,. B. Kitter.idge; 
~he House sent Representatives ·Hepburn, Fletcher, and Davey 
. . 
tq .the committee. The· cornmi ttee met several: ·times before 
they broke the imp~sse caused by Morgan, Hepburn and 
Fletcher favoring Nicaragua, and Hanna, Kitteridge, and 
·nayey being equally committed to Panama. · As ·the end of the 
week drew nea~, the stalemate was finally broken, one of 
the Nicaragua. proponents· switched his support to the Panama 
. . 
route. Joh~ Morgan, the father of the ·.Nicaraguan ·canal·, 
agreed to vote. for the Spooner·Bill on June 25, l902. 34 
.Thotfgh Senator Morgan never stated his reasons for 
the sudden sw;i tch in his vote, . his motives are clear. · 
Morgan was convinced that the President would never.get 
clear title· from the Colombian ·Government for the.Wyse Con-
·cessio~, and that eventually he would have· to turn to 
Nicaragua_. The House of Representatives, in a dramatic 
turnabout voted to accept the committee recommendation by 
over ~wo. hundreJ ·votes. Many_ members of Congress must have 
agreed with Morgan's thinking; and many more must have felt 
34 New Yo~x Times, June 26, 1902, ·p. 1. 
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35 
that any canal was pref~r~ble tQ no canal. William Hep-
burn did not vote to adopt the comtni ttee recommenda.tion·, 
nor· did he ever fo~give Morgan for what he considered a 
.betrayal. Hepburn knevr only that :the bill authorizing the 
construction of a t'ransisthmian canal would not· bear his 
nam~. 
The President receiyed the Spooner Bill, as it was 
then known; on June.28, 1902, and signed it into law. The 
President was elated to have the bill, a~d gave credit for 
its passage to Senators Hanna· and Ki tteridg.e ~ 36 How much 
consideration th~·Presideni had giveri to the clause of the 
bill that callsd for him to negotiate ~ith Nicaragua if 
the Colombian Government could not agree to the transfer of 
the concession is not, known. The events of November 1903 
would suggest that the' President never gave serious con-
sideration to Nicaragua after the signi~g of the biil. 
The Co.ngress· of ·the United States had decided to 
recommend the building· of a canal through Panama, an.d the 
President had 4 signed into law.the bill that would ma~e it 
. 
possible. The· fight for the ro·ute appeared· over. The ne;x:t 
eighteen months would prove th~t the battlefield had . 
changed, _though many of t~e·warriors had not. The.battle 
mqved in·to the .diplomatic realm, be~w~en ·Bogota and 
35 Congressional .Record, vol. 35, 57th Congress, 1st 
Session, Hous~, p. 7441. 
36 
.New York Times, July 1, 1902, p. 4. 
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h . 37 Was .1.ngton. 
With the.s~gning of the Spooner .Bill, many of the ad-
vocates o.i' the Pana.:ma route hop.ed the bitterness was .over. 
Senator Hanna, and even William Nelson Cromwell, .hop~d that 
Senator Morgan could be appeased. · Ov~rtures were made ·t6 
the Senator to have him remain at.the.head of the canal com-
·mittee, though all overtures were spurned. Morgan.became 
fur.ious when Hanna informed him that he would always be 
considered 'the father of the Panama route. 38 
Senator Morgan never gave up h_is interest in ·the pr9-
ject, for the ·rest of his life he sat. on the committee· 
that oversaw. the construction •. While serving on the canal 
committee he kept a file on the project and scrutinized 
·every transaction. Morgan knew by the middle of July 1903 
.that ·the Nicaragua ·route was·· finished, but he was still 
convinced that he had been right. The file on the Isthmian 
Canal ~as a record to prove his point. The fanatic of the 
Ni.caragua, route became the watchdog of the Panama route. 
. . 
The files he kept show that he qontinued to investigate and 
scrutinize the role played by both Bunau-Varilla and Cro_m-
·well, and that he locked horns with the New York attorney 
. . 39 
again _·in .a Senate hear1.ng. The Alabaman also continued 
37 M' ·p h . 1.ner, anama Route, t e second· half of th1.s work 
deals with this question. , 
·38 
onnrlro flrnnrino~r, ;,NMW JJlQht. on tho DJnJm~ cnRnl 
Treaty, .. The Hispanlc-Americq.n History Review, February, 1966. 
39 .Th~· Papers of John Tyler Morgan in the National 
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investigating the role played by the railroad officials. 
_In .. pursuing this investigation he. hroll:ght to light ·tha~ 
John Pierpont Morgan,.the financier, had received the con-
tract to .act as the ag~nt of the French Company in the 
tran~fererice of the $40 ~illion. 40 Though.the New York 
Times may have been.wrong in· assert~ng that ~he railroad 
·peopl.~ were behind the Panama route to des tory any canal, 
Morgan did find evid~nce that if. the railroad coctld not stop 
the canal ·from being .built, a:t least one J;llan with railroad 
interests was going to get involved in.the project .. Sen-
a tor Morgan. died be fore the Panama canal was completed, and 
also before the Cromwell litigation started in the French 
courts. He never ·saw.· the complet~on of the project h_e in-
directly was responsi~le for, nor did. he -ever have the 
satisfaction of Cromwell's admission that he was indeed-the 
behind-the-scenes n:tan.ipulator of tJ:?.e Panama "lobby. 11 
It is impossible to give a _percentage breakdown of 
the factors that led the Uni~e.d States away from the Nic-
aragua route and onto the Panama route, nonetheless certain 
_factors do ~tand ·aut-as important. The international sit-
uation that Great· Britain found herself in f·orced her to 
Archives Box 26, "Papers on ·the· Isthmian Canal, 11 from a memo 
dated 1904. The _memo concerns a company titled th.e Panama 
Suff
1Y C9mfTifij lfiii. ufiDIDUull WQu Ql]O arrilifit~d With. 
40. . 
Morgan· Papers, Box 26. March 11, 1904. In this 
I?aper Morgan suggests that of the $40 million paid out by 
the Uni t~d States ·through. J. P. Morgan, ·over two million 
wound up in W. N. Cromwell's pocket. There seems to be no 
corroborating eyidence of this accusation, not even in his 
own papers. 
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renegotiate th:e ·clay·ton-Bulwer Treaty, and the dynamic 
nature .of the situation allow·ed her to c]J.oose her oVln pace 
for the renegotiatio~. If the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty had 
not existed, or if the. -l'!nited States Senate had not modi-
fied so· drastically·the first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, the 
Nicaragua route might very well_~ave been adopted in early 
19 01 ... ·Despite the imperialist expansionism that dominated 
the age; the Uriited States Congress was wary of violating 
a treaty obligation wi:th a country as powerfu,l as Great 
Britain .. 
Wiliiam Nelson CromWel·l and Philippe Bunau-Varilla 
both played import~nt roles in influencing the decision for 
· Panama. The incredible· ego of the French engineer, and the 
obse?sion with covert activity of the New York attorney 
.. 
made it. difficult to evaluate just how important a :r::ole 
they played. Both·men take credit for ~onver:ting Senator 
Hanna to the cause of Panama, while both men ~eject any 
·claim .that the other one accomplished anything significant. 
Rec.ent ev.i<I.ence has shown that; the two men did w~rk t.ogether, 
·but it is not really· known how much.. Cromwell. was to claim 
in his brief·. that. he was responsible for the ·establishment 
of the Isthmian Canal Commission, better ·known as the 
second Walker Commission .. ·He also claimed that he influ-
enceq President McKinley's .selection of who was on the com-
fu~ssion, ~et Professor Haupt, the stronges~ advocate of the 
Nicaragua. route was included despite Cro~well'~ attempt to 
insure that he Vlould not be included. 
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The. single most importan't figu;re on the Panama side 
of the issue seems· to be Mark Hanna~ Bunau-Varilla -claimed 
one of the·most important things he did in the n~me of the 
Panama route was to. convince· this incredibly powerful man 
of the rightness ·of the route. President Roosevelt, an old 
political· enemy of Hanna's, gave him credit for the vi:~tory 
of the Panama route. · William Nelson Cromwell tried to take 
credit .for ~he sp~ech he m~de that cemented the victory for 
the ?pooner Amendment. .The s·tatements of two Sena.tors prob-
ably go a long way in explaining the impact of Hanna•s· 
speech. Senator Pla~t stated that Hanna 1s speech, "was the 
most effective speech made in the-Senat'e during his ca .... 
reer."
41 Senator Frye maintains in the same work that Hanna 
changed his thinkin·g, after "a· life long advocacy of Nic-
aragua."42 
The·erupt~on of Mt. Pelee is another factor that 
played a crit1cal role in.the vote for the Panama.route. 
If the eruption had not taken p~ace ,.'Hanna's speech would 
not have concentrated so heavily on the danger of: natural 
dis·aster in Ni·caragua., the part of the speech that is gener-
ally c.onsidered the most· import~nt. The ~ruption undoubt-
edly maqe the Senate ~olcano ·conscious, at a time when 
there was discussion ~oncerning the possibility _of spending 
41 Herbert Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna: His Li.fe. arid 
Works1 p. 384. Also, Miner, Panama Route, p. 151. 
'42 . . 
Ibid.,··crply-, p. 384, Ibid., Miner, p. 151. 
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millions .of dollars in a country where volcanoes w.ere numer-
ous. Still the .tide seems· to have turned before the. erup-
tiqn. Predictions· of the victory of the Spoone.r Amendment 
precede the eruption. 
The one factor· that seems to best shape ~he opinion 
on ·-the ro.ute selec.tion is the report· of the Walker Commis-
sion.· Congressmen Burton and Cannon· justified .. their de-
cision to wait before voting on a route because the Walker 
Report was not comp1eted. When the report.did come out in 
favor of Nicaragua neither man raised an object~on to the 
Hepburn Bill in January 1902. Senators._Morgan, Mitchell, 
and Harris, as well as the ies·s active advocates ·of the 
Nicaragua route used the Walker Commission .Report a·s their 
primary source of evidence. Senator Hanna in his gx:eat 
speech useq the Walke1; Report more than any other single 
source. Cromwell claimed to be instrumental in the.panel 
selection. in ·the same bri~f in which he claimed .to have 
written Hanna's speech~ Bunau-Vari~la realized the impor-
tance. of the commission by his reaction·to their initial 
recommendation for Nicaragua. The Frenchman knew that p.n-
less the company acted immediately the report would win 
OV~IWh@liDing support.in !h~ Ul'lit~B Qt:~t:~s as the final 
authority. In January 1902, af.ter the \valker Commission 
·Report had recommended the Nicaragua route, the House of 
Representatives voted .30 6. to 2 in favo-r of the Nicara.gua 
canal •. ·In June 1902, after the Walker Commiss.ion Report 
' had filed a supplemental· report favoring the Panama route, 
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the un1ted States Senate voted to build a .canal through 
Panama. The House of Representatives then voted over-
wh.elmin<J.lY to go along with the Seriate·. The factors that 
went into the decision to vot·e for Panama rathe·r thari Ni·c-
aragua are numerous, and are the'purpose of this study, but 
the one unifying ef·fect is the report. No government body 
r·ecommended the Panama route before the Walker Commission 
~eport,· and no government body .recommended the Nicaragua 
canal after ·the Walker Coinmission swit~hed to favoring the 
Panama route. The selection of the Panama route was de-
pendent ·_on such. diverse factors as· international diplomac'y, 
volcanoe~, le~islative investigation, -lobbying, and pos-
sibly even bribes, but the most important factor was the 
Report of the ·Isthmian Canal Commission. 
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